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T H O M A S  S C O T T - R A I L T O N  
A Legal Sanctuary: How the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act Could Protect Sanctuary Churches 
abstract.  The last three decades have witnessed tectonic shifts in the doctrine and political 
valence of laws protecting religious exercise. In this Note, I analyze how this change has created 
the potential for sanctuary churches to receive greater legal protections today than during the 
1980s sanctuary movement. This case study illustrates signiﬁcant shifts in religious accommoda-
tion doctrine and helps to illuminate the transsubstantive nature of religious exercise protections. 
By drawing attention to sanctuary claims, this Note also helps to disrupt the existing partisan di-
vide over religious freedom by reminding progressives of the potential value of RFRA claims for 
marginalized individuals, while highlighting to conservatives the importance of placing limits on 
religious accommodation claims. My hope is that this will motivate a return to an earlier consensus 
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introduction 
On the morning of June 20, 2017, Nury Chavarria faced a heart-wrenching 
choice.
1
 A victim of violence in her country of origin, Ms. Chavarria had ﬂed 
Guatemala to the United States in 1993.
2
 While she lacked an affirmative legal 
status that would permit her to remain in the country, Chavarria had not been 
an enforcement priority for Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). She 
had no criminal record and was the mother of four U.S. citizen children, the 
oldest of whom suffered from cerebral palsy.
3
 Since 2011, she had faithfully at-
tended her regular check-ins with ICE.
4
 After living in the country for twenty-
four years, she had been told that her time had run out and that she should re-
turn to the ICE office within a month with a plane ticket.
5
 Instead of turning 
herself in on the morning of her scheduled deportation, she went to the Iglesia 
de Dios Pentecostal, a small, predominantly Latinx congregation in New Ha-
ven.
6
 The pastor of the church, Hector Otero, faced a choice of his own: turn 
Ms. Chavarria away at the door or let her in and risk retaliation from the federal 
government against his small church. By later that day, community members 
and faith leaders had begun to rally around the Iglesia de Dios Pentecostal, where 
Nury Chavarria was in sanctuary.
7
 
The deeply personal decisions taken by Pastor Otero and Nury Chavarria 
took place against a complex backdrop of intersecting laws regulating immigra-
tion and protecting religious freedom. When Chavarria arrived at the church 
 
1. Jeff Cohen, Norwalk Woman Ordered Deported Seeks Sanctuary in New Haven Church, WNPR 
(July 20, 2017), http://wnpr.org/post/norwalk-woman-ordered-deported-seeks-sanctuary 
-new-haven-church [https://perma.cc/FZ48-WU4J]. 
2. Sarah Jorgensen & Lauren del Valle, Mom Taking Refuge in Church Gets Stay on Deportation, 
CNN (July 26, 2017, 10:01 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/07/26/us/ct-deportation 
-church-refugee-granted-stay [https://perma.cc/SY22-L32M]. 
3. Id. 
4. Id. Previously, where individuals were a low priority for removal, ICE could simply require 
them to check in at regular intervals. The Trump administration has broadly expanded the 
categories of enforcement priorities, resulting in arrests during these check-ins. See Joel Rose, 
Once Routine, ICE Check-Ins Now Fill Immigrants in U.S. Illegally with Anxiety, NPR (Apr. 18, 
2017, 4:45 AM), https://www.npr.org/2017/04/18/524365639/once-routine-ice-check-ins 
-now-ﬁll-immigrants-in-u-s-illegally-with-anxiety [https://perma.cc/9GHZ-7GUL]. 
5. Sandra Gomez-Aceves, Journey to Freedom Continues for Mother Facing Deportation, HARTFORD 
COURANT (July 27, 2017, 6:22 AM), http://www.courant.com/news/connecticut/hc-new 
-haven-nury-chavarria-20170726-story.html [https://perma.cc/X2P3-3MFE]. 
6. Jorgensen & del Valle, supra note 2. 
7. Cohen, supra note 1; Christopher Peak, Fleeing ICE, Immigrant Moves into Church, NEW HAVEN 
IND. (July 21, 2017, 2:03 PM), https://www.newhavenindependent.org/index.php/archives
/entry/ICE_sanctuary_church [https://perma.cc/VNV7-WLP8]. 
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doors seeking sanctuary, did federal antiharboring laws require Pastor Otero to 
close the door on her—or were his actions shielded under federal protections for 
religious exercise? And once Ms. Chavarria was in sanctuary, were there any legal 
limitations on ICE’s authority to come into the church to arrest and deport her? 
The last time these questions were litigated in federal court was during the sanc-
tuary movement of the 1980s. Back then, the Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and 
Ninth Circuits held that providing sanctuary to undocumented immigrants was 
a felony; religion was no defense. The academic literature on sanctuary has gen-
erally accepted this conclusion. Yet the answer today may be quite different. Un-
beknownst to the individuals in this story, their early morning decisions oc-
curred at a time when religious freedom was coming to enjoy steadily increasing 
legal protection, thanks in a large part to the efforts of conservative Christian 
activists and lawyers. 
This Note offers a novel analysis of how sanctuary claims would fare today 
under the Supreme Court’s recent interpretations of the Religious Freedom Res-
toration Act (RFRA). I argue that under both the doctrine and values of RFRA, 
churches like the Iglesia de Dios Pentecostal can lawfully provide some degree of 
sanctuary. In addition to analyzing this doctrinal claim, this Note also examines 
a broader shift that has occurred in the movement for religious freedom and the 
associated scholarly literature. Throughout much of the twentieth century, reli-
gious exceptions to laws of general applicability tended to ﬁnd support among 
progressives and opposition from conservatives. Yet over the past decade and a 
half, the political allegiances have ﬂipped. Today, conservative groups seek to 





 while progressives have mostly argued for more limited pro-
tection. 
Yet these battle lines are far from inevitable. As they have historically, ex-
panded religious freedom protections can serve to further goals that progressives 
consider important, providing meaningful safeguards for minority faiths and 
subordinate groups, as well as for those who assist them out of religious obliga-
tion. Perhaps counterintuitively, focusing on politically charged RFRA claims 
made by the left, such as sanctuary, could help to defuse partisan debates over 
religious freedom and produce a more stable equilibrium between the values un-
derlying religious accommodation and society’s need to enforce laws of general 
applicability. By forcing conservatives and progressives to confront these ques-
tions of religious freedom from the opposite perspective, reconciliation and com-
promise can become more attainable. What might this look like? Bipartisan con-
sensus around the need to protect disadvantaged groups from the greater 
 
8. 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
9. 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016). 
a legal sanctuary 
413 
political inﬂuence of mainstream faiths was a core impetus behind RFRA’s de-
sign and passage in 1993. Interpreting RFRA in light of this special solicitude for 
the needs of disadvantaged groups will help balance the need for accommoda-
tions with the protection of other essential values such as effective governance, 
LGBT rights, and access to reproductive health care. 
Part I describes the history of the sanctuary movement and its current form 
today. Part II tracks the evolution and current state of religious freedom protec-
tions under RFRA. Part III analyzes two types of sanctuary issues under current 
RFRA doctrine: (1) whether sanctuary churches should receive an exception 
from federal laws prohibiting various forms of assistance to undocumented in-
dividuals; and (2) whether RFRA would place limits on ICE’s ability to raid or 
surveil places of worship. Finally, Part IV examines the substantive-equality ra-
tionale and concerns about subordinate groups underlying RFRA’s effects-based 
protections, as well as the perils of overaccommodation. This Part further argues 
that sanctuary claims could help restore a preexisting equilibrium to religious 
accommodation law by interpreting the doctrine in light of the commitment to 
substantive-equality that produced the initial consensus around RFRA. That is, 
if courts were to analyze various open questions in RFRA doctrine with an eye 
to the particular harms that arise from the unequal treatment of disadvantaged 
groups, this could help to restore the law’s original consensus and avoid the di-
visiveness produced by recent claims brought by politically inﬂuential, main-
stream faith groups. 
i .  sanctuary movement past and present  
The last time that sanctuary congregations received national attention was 
the mid-1980s. As deadly violence raged in El Salvador and Guatemala, faith 
groups in the Southwest and across the country began providing shelter to ref-
ugees and helping them travel from place to place.
10
 In response, the federal gov-
ernment used informants to inﬁltrate churches, leading to the charging and con-
viction of sanctuary-movement members under felony antiharboring laws.
11
 
Nonetheless, the legal advocacy that emerged out of this sanctuary movement 
produced signiﬁcantly stronger protections for refugees.
12
 The legal legacy of 
the 1980s sanctuary movement is therefore a mixed one. While the religious de-
fenses brought by sanctuary members in their criminal trials were unavailing, 
the movement’s charity and acts of moral witness helped to reframe America’s 
understanding of its legal obligation to refugees from Central America. And at 
 
10. See infra Section I.A. 
11. See infra Section I.B. 
12. See infra Section I.C. 
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the human level, the sanctuary movement helped provide basic shelter, 
transport, and care for thousands. 
A. The Movement 
The sanctuary movement of the 1980s can only be understood in the context 
of the brutal violence taking place in El Salvador and Guatemala—and the U.S. 
government’s systematic failure to provide refuge to those ﬂeeing that violence. 
Here, I provide an abridged account. 
By 1980, El Salvador was in profound crisis.
13
 In October 1979, junior offic-
ers in the military overthrew the government, promising political and land re-
form.
14
 In response, the military high command, supported by large property 
owners, conducted a coup from within, consolidating power through brutal vi-
olence.
15
 Far-right death squads and military forces began a campaign of ter-
ror.
16
 Dissidents and activists associated with the Catholic Church and with la-
bor unions were murdered, as were government officials and reformers within 
the military.
17
  On March 24, 1980, the widely respected Archbishop Óscar 
Arnulfo Romero was murdered while performing Mass.
18
 Romero had run a 
popular radio program, through which he delivered sermons denouncing the 
nation’s violence and human rights abuses to listeners across the country.
19
 In 
what would be his ﬁnal homily, Archbishop Romero called upon soldiers to dis-
obey orders to kill innocent civilians.
20
 When 50,000 marchers took to the streets 
for Romero’s funeral, they were sprayed with pesticide by crop-dusting planes 
before gunﬁre and bombs killed dozens.
21
 Across the country, the violence in-
tensiﬁed. In 1980 alone, between 16,000 and 20,000 El Salvadorans were killed 
 
13. WILLIAM STANLEY, THE PROTECTION RACKET STATE: ELITE POLITICS, MILITARY EXTORTION 
AND CIVIL WAR IN EL SALVADOR 178-83 (1996); Comm’n on the Truth for El Salvador, From 
Madness to Hope: The 12-Year War in El Salvador: Report of the Commission on the Truth for El 
Salvador, UNITED NATIONS 20-22 (Apr. 1, 1993), https://www.usip.org/sites/default/ﬁles/ﬁle
/ElSalvador-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/4NRU-DPU2] [hereinafter From Madness to 
Hope]. 
14. STANLEY, supra note 13, at 133-34. 
15. Id. at 134-37, 180, 189-90. 
16. Id. at 205-06. 
17. Id. at 134-37, 178-80, 189-90, 205-06. 
18. Id. at 178. 
19. Id. at 196-97. 
20. Id. at 197. 
21. Id. at 198. 




 In some rural areas, entire communities were massacred.
23
 A 
report by a United Nations commission would later publish testimony estimat-
ing that almost eighty-ﬁve percent of the acts of political violence during the 
conﬂict were attributable “to agents of the [El Salvadoran government], para-
military groups allied with them, and the death squads.”
24
 
In Guatemala, a right-wing government exerted similar violence against 
those who advocated for political and economic reform, as well as those who 
advocated for the rights of indigenous Guatemalans.
25
 The U.S. government 
bore some responsibility for the violence in both countries. As part of its wider 
Cold War strategy, the United States provided support for the ruling govern-
ment of El Salvador during the civil war.
26
 The CIA had been responsible for the 
coup that had initially placed a Guatemalan military junta in power.
27
 And for a 
time, the United States was also the sole military contractor to the Guatemalan 
junta,
28
 which was responsible for ninety-three percent of the registered violence 




The United States not only played a role in the conﬂicts, but also closed its 
doors to the refugees ﬂeeing those conﬂicts—even when the refugees had legiti-
mate asylum claims. Congress and President Carter had recently enacted the 
Refugee Act of 1980,
30
  which established “uniform and nondiscriminatory 
standards for the admission of refugees.”
31
 The government would later admit 
it was thus under a legal obligation to consider refugees’ claims without refer-
 
22. ELISABETH JEAN WOOD, INSURGENT COLLECTIVE ACTION AND CIVIL WAR IN EL SALVADOR 9 
ﬁg.1.3 (2003). 
23. STANLEY, supra note 13, at 210. 
24. From Madness to Hope, supra note 13, at 36. 
25. Carolyn Patty Blum, The Settlement of American Baptist Churches v. Thornburgh: Landmark 
Victory for Central American Asylum-Seekers, 3 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 347, 349 (1991); Guatemala: 
Memory of Silence, COMMISSION FOR HIST. CLARIFICATION 18-24, 29-33 (Feb. 1999), https://
www.aaas.org/sites/default/ﬁles/migrate/uploads/mos_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/BK2N 
-7JCX]. 
26. STANLEY, supra note 13, at 182, 226. 
27. TIM WEINER, LEGACY OF ASHES: THE HISTORY OF THE CIA 93-103 (2008); see also Guatemala: 
Memory of Silence, supra note 25, at 19 (noting the role of the 1954 coup in closing political 
spaces and producing repression). 
28. Douglas L. Colbert, The Motion in Limine: Trial Without Jury: A Government’s Weapon Against 
the Sanctuary Movement, 15 HOFSTRA L. REV. 5, 28 (1986). 
29. Guatemala: Memory of Silence, supra note 25, at 33-34, 39-41. 
30. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102. 
31. Am. Baptist Churches in the U.S.A. v. Meese, 712 F. Supp. 756, 767 (N.D. Cal. 1989). 
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ence to the relationship between the governments of their countries of origin and 
the United States.
32
 Despite this, the U.S. asylum process systemically disfa-
vored refugees ﬂeeing the violence in El Salvador and Guatemala. Indeed, while 
the sanctuary movement is remembered mostly as a kind of underground rail-
road, the ﬁrst incarnation of the movement made sincere efforts to play by the 
rules. As Central American refugees poured in, church groups organized to help 
them navigate the official asylum process.
33
 An interdenominational coalition of 
Southwestern churchgoers raised funds and mortgaged their homes to pay the 
bail of refugees and to provide them with lawyers for their asylum hearings.
34
 
Yet the agency adjudicating these claims, the Immigration and Naturalization 
Service (INS), was decidedly unsympathetic: none of the 1,400 people who ﬁled 
for political asylum through these Arizona legal projects between 1980 and 1982 
were granted it.
35
 Between 1982 and 1985, the grant rate for El Salvadorans was 
2.6%, and for Guatemalans less than 0.5%.
36
 In contrast, refugees from countries 
whose governments were politically opposed to the United States had exponen-
tially higher rates of asylum approvals.
37
 In 1983, for example, the approval rate 
for Iranian applicants was 72%, for Afghans 62%, and for Poles just over 30%.
38
 
Refugees who presented themselves to the U.S. government and failed to 
receive asylum faced deportation and a serious threat of violence upon return to 
their countries of origin. The road connecting the airport where deported Salva-
dorans would arrive to the capital of San Salvador was called the “road to death” 
due to the frequent display of dead bodies along the roadside.
39
 In 1980, this 
road was the site of the infamous kidnapping, rape, and murder of three Amer-
ican Maryknoll nuns and a lay worker.
40
 
It was in response to these twin crises—the horriﬁc violence in Central Amer-
ica and the U.S. government’s failure to follow its legal obligations—that some 
churches announced they would begin providing physical sanctuary. The term 
“sanctuary” encapsulated different things for different members of the move-
 
32. Am. Baptist Churches v. Thornburgh, 760 F. Supp. 796, 799 (N.D. Cal. 1991). 
33. Colbert, supra note 28, at 33-34. 
34. Id. at 33. 
35. Id. at 34. 
36. Id. 
37. Blum, supra note 25, at 350 n.18 (citing U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-GGD-87-
33BR, ASYLUM: UNIFORM APPLICATION OF STANDARDS UNCERTAIN—FEW DENIED APPLICANTS 
DEPORTED (1987)). 
38. Colbert, supra note 28, at 35. 
39. Id. at 31 n.132. 
40. Id. 
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ment, but the aspect I focus on here can be speciﬁcally deﬁned: the network of 
places of worship of multiple denominations that provided shelter, aid, and 
transportation for refugees from El Salvador and Guatemala.
41
 At the height of 
the movement in 1987, an interfaith network of congregations operated around 
400 public sanctuaries.
42
 A small subset of sanctuary activists also traveled to 
Central America to escort refugees up from Mexico.
43
 
B. Arrests, Prosecutions, and Convictions 
From the federal government’s perspective, the sanctuary movement threat-
ened its ability to control the borders and determine refugee policy. It also 
brought public attention to the violence in Central America, highlighting the 
United States’ complicity at home and abroad. The federal government was not 
long in retaliating. As early as 1983, the INS began an undercover investigation 
dubbed “Operation Sojourner” to disrupt the sanctuary movement.
44
 The INS 
recruited two former “coyotes”—persons who smuggled others for proﬁt—to 
pose as refugees and inﬁltrate sanctuary churches.
45
 These former coyotes and 
other undercover INS agents recorded conversations, “tracked people who at-
tended services during which Sanctuary was discussed,” and wiretapped Bible 
study meetings.
46
 Ultimately, the INS arrested over sixty sanctuary workers, pri-
marily charging them under 8 U.S.C. § 1324 for offenses related to harboring and 




The sanctuary providers raised a number of defenses, including the argu-




41. Karen E. Lavarnway, Note, The Closing of the Golden Door: Necessity, International Law and 
Freedom of Religion Are Failing as Defenses for Sanctuary Movement Workers, 25 U. RICH. L. REV. 
367, 369 (1991). 
42. GRACE YUKICH, ONE FAMILY UNDER GOD: IMMIGRATION POLITICS AND PROGRESSIVE RELIGION 
IN AMERICA 77 (2013). 
43. Lavarnway, supra note 41, at 369. 
44. Emily Breslin, Note, The Road to Liability Is Paved with Humanitarian Intentions: Criminal Li-
ability for Housing Undocumented People Under 8 U.S.C. S 1324(a)(1)(a)(III), 11 RUTGERS J.L. 
& RELIGION 214, 218-19 (2009). 
45. Sung-Hee Suh, Sanctuary: A Story of American Conscience and Law in Collision, 24 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 602, 605 (1989) (book review). 
46. Id. at 605 n.5. 
47. See United States v. Aguilar, 883 F.2d 662 (9th Cir. 1989); Lavarnway, supra note 41, at 372. 
48. Breslin, supra note 44, at 222. 
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 These cases arose at a time when constitutional 
protections for religious freedom were in ﬂux. Conscious of the uncertainty in 
the law and perhaps out of an abundance of caution, courts purported to apply 
a test akin to heightened scrutiny.
53
  Under this test, courts would analyze 
whether prosecution for providing sanctuary placed a substantial burden on the 
defendants’ religious exercise, and if so, whether that burden was imposed in 
furtherance of a compelling government interest via the least restrictive means 
available.
54
 Although RFRA formally incorporates this same standard today, the 
test as applied is quite different from what it was in the 1980s. 
In Merkt, the Fifth Circuit rejected the claim that prosecution under anti-
harboring laws placed a “substantial burden” on the religious exercise of sanctu-
ary workers. First, the court noted that § 1324 was a law of general application 
that “contain[ed] no explicit prohibition on religious practices or beliefs.”
55
 Sec-
ond, the court relied on testimony by other members of Catholic and Methodist 
clergy, who stated “that devout Christian belief [does not] mandate[] participa-
tion in the ‘sanctuary movement.’”
56
 In essence, the court applied a standard un-
der which the First Amendment only protects individuals from laws that specif-
ically target obligatory religious conduct, as understood by certain clergy 
members of the same faith. This was incorrect even then, as the Supreme Court 
had found in Thomas v. Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security Division
57
 
that differing interpretations between members of the same faith did not justify 
rejecting a free exercise claim.
58
 The Fifth Circuit also expressed skepticism that 
sanctuary workers were acting out of religious motives, as opposed to political 
ones. Rather than gathering funds for Salvadorans or “perform[ing] their min-
istry in El Salvador,” sanctuary workers “chose confrontational, illegal means to 
 
49. United States v. Merkt, 764 F.2d 266 (5th Cir. 1985). 
50. United States v. Elder, 601 F. Supp. 1574 (S.D. Tex. 1985). 
51. United States v. Merkt, 794 F.2d 950 (5th Cir. 1986). 
52. United States v. Aguilar, 883 F.2d 662 (9th Cir. 1989). 
53. See, e.g., Aguilar, 883 F.2d at 694; Merkt II, 794 F.2d at 955. 
54. Merkt II, 794 F.2d at 956. 
55. Id. 
56. Id. 
57. 450 U.S. 707 (1981). 
58. Id. at 715 (“The Indiana court also appears to have given signiﬁcant weight to the fact that 
another Jehovah’s Witness had no scruples about working on tank turrets . . . . Intrafaith dif-
ferences of that kind are not uncommon among followers of a particular creed, and the judicial 
process is singularly ill equipped to resolve such differences . . . .”). 
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practice their religious views—the ‘burden’ was voluntarily assumed and not im-
posed on them by the government.”
59
 
The Fifth and Ninth Circuits went further than just assessing substantial 
burden, however, determining that the government had a compelling interest in 
the general and uniform application of immigration law. Controlling immigra-
tion was a “fundamental sovereign attribute” and decisions by the political 
branches regarding expulsion or exclusion were “largely immune from judicial 
control.”
60
 The courts also rejected the defendants’ arguments that the govern-
ment needed to show a compelling interest in the enforcement of each of the 
statutory subsections under which they had been convicted.
61
 The prohibitions 
set out in § 1324 were “but one facet of the comprehensive legal framework gov-
erning entry into the United States and admission to its citizenship.”
62
 The gov-
ernment had a compelling interest in the uniform and general application of this 
system, especially since criminal penalties were involved.
63
 
These courts were also suspicious that a “less restrictive” alternative was 
available. Allowing a free exercise exception to § 1324 would effectively open the 
ﬂoodgates, they argued. The defendants were members of four Christian de-
nominations with an “incalculable” number of members who would “purport-
edly require their adherents to engage in sanctuary activity.”
64
 The Ninth Circuit 
raised the specter of a slippery slope, positing that providing an exception for 
sanctuary would “result in no immigration policy at all.”
65
  
As a result, the courts conclusively rejected the activists’ free exercise de-
fenses. The courts treated these outcomes as forgone conclusions. This is not 
surprising, given the retrenchment of religious freedom protections then under-
way. However, as I argue in Part III, an analogous case under RFRA would fare 
far better today. 
 
59. Merkt II, 794 F.2d at 956. 
60. United States v. Aguilar, 883 F.2d 662, 695 (9th Cir. 1989) (quoting Shaughnessy v. United 
States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 210 (1953)); Merkt II, 794 F.2d at 955 (“Control of one’s 
borders and of the identity of one’s citizens is an essential feature of national sovereignty.”). 
61. Aguilar, 883 F.2d at 695 (“[A]ppellants invite us to analyze their ﬁrst amendment claim by 
focusing on smuggling, transporting, and harboring individually, requiring the government 
to demonstrate an overriding interest with respect to each. We decline this invitation.” (cita-
tion omitted)). 
62. Merkt II, 794 F.2d at 955. 
63. Id. at 956. 
64. Aguilar, 883 F.2d at 696 (quoting United States v. Elder, 601 F. Supp 1574, 1579 (S.D. Tex. 
1985)). 
65. Id. 
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C. Aftermath and Legacy 
While religious-sanctuary claims fared poorly in the courts, the sanctuary 
movement played an important role in drawing public attention to the plight of 
Salvadoran and Guatemalan refugees.
66
 As part of a coalition of immigrants’ 
rights activists, sanctuary churches undertook an energetic campaign of press, 
legislative advocacy, and litigation. 
In 1991, religious organizations achieved a favorable settlement to litigation 
on behalf of a nationwide class of Guatemalan and Salvadoran refugees, chal-
lenging the refugee system as discriminatory and alleging violations of the First 
Amendment.
67
 Although the First Amendment claims were largely dismissed on 
standing grounds,
68
 the plaintiffs in American Baptist Churches v. Thornburgh ne-
gotiated an important settlement, in which the government agreed to the de 
novo readjudication of over 100,000 class members’ applications.
69
 In essence, 
this amounted to an implicit concession that many refugee applications had been 
unfairly adjudicated. While awaiting readjudication, class members were to re-




The INS also announced that it would promulgate new asylum regulations, 
creating a new corps of dedicated asylum officers to replace the “mere handful of 
harried examiners in district offices.”
71
 This reform was signiﬁcant, as the prior 
system had been criticized for a lack of training and guidance, as well as for 
“brusqueness, bias and ineptitude” among the examiners, which partly explains 
why bias and political pressure had been able to play such a large role in individ-
ual outcomes.
72
 Beyond the executive branch, Congress passed a new law creat-
 
66. YUKICH, supra note 42, at 76 (noting the prevalence of media interest from the outset); Rose 
Cuison Villazor, What Is a “Sanctuary”?, 61 SMU L. REV. 133, 141-42 (2008). 
67. Eli Coffino, A Long Road to Residency: The Legal History of Salvadoran and Guatemalan Immi-
gration to the United States with a Focus on NACARA, 14 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 177, 186-
88 (2006). 
68. Am. Baptist Churches in the U.S.A. v. Meese, 712 F. Supp. 756, 762 (N.D. Cal. 1989). 
69. Am. Baptist Churches v. Thornburgh, 760 F. Supp. 796, 799 (N.D. Cal. 1991); Kevin R. John-
son, Los Olvidados: Images of the Immigrant, Political Power of Noncitizens, and Immigration 
Law and Enforcement, 1993 BYU L. REV. 1139, 1211. 
70. Blum, supra note 25, at 354. 
71. David A. Martin, Reforming Asylum Adjudication: On Navigating the Coast of Bohemia, 138 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1247, 1376 (1990). 
72. Peter C. Diamond, Temporary Protected Status Under the Immigration Act of 1990, 28 
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 857, 872 (1992). 
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ing Temporary Protected Status (TPS)
73
 for Salvadoran nationals physically pre-
sent in the United States as of 1990. The law established criteria and procedures 
for these individuals to receive work authorization and a stay of deportation until 
conditions in El Salvador improved.
74
 By October 31, 1991, 186,030 Salvadorans 
had applied for TPS.
75
 Peace negotiations in El Salvador began and were ﬁnal-
ized on January 16, 1992.
76
 As the violence quieted down and the U.S. govern-
ment began considering asylum applications in a nondiscriminatory manner, the 
physical sanctuary movement dissipated.
77
 
The sanctuary movement was an incomplete response to a human catastro-
phe of massive proportions. The movement was composed of a wide variety of 
actors with different motivations—some political, some religious, many both.
78
 
It nonetheless helped to galvanize public opinion in the United States and, in the 
meantime, provided shelter and safe haven for thousands of refugees who had 
been unlawfully denied asylum status.
79
 If the movement had waited for the le-
gal vindication of its claims of bias in the asylum system, hundreds of refugees 
would have been deported, some to their deaths. Despite the government’s em-
phasis on the rule of law, the sanctuary movement and resulting litigation ex-
posed the INS’s systematic noncompliance with the legal rules protecting asy-
lum seekers. The sanctuary movement arose as an emergency response to this 
failure. Once the government agreed to fulﬁll its legal obligations in a nondis-
criminatory manner, the movement receded. 
D. Sanctuary Today 
Interest in a new sanctuary movement arose again in the mid-2000s in re-
sponse to the failures of comprehensive immigration reform efforts and the de-
portations of the parents of U.S.-citizen children. Commentators tend to date 
the resurgence of interest in sanctuary to August 2006, when Elvira Arellano 
 
73. Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (1990) (codiﬁed at 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1254a (2018)). 
74. Diamond, supra note 72, at 858, 865-71. 
75. Id. at 871. 
76. WOOD, supra note 22, at 29. 
77. Villazor, supra note 66, at 142 n.58. 
78. See, e.g., Suh, supra note 45, at 606-07 (discussing the tensions within the movement and the 
different motivations of different actors). 
79. See Villazor, supra note 66, at 141-42. 
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took sanctuary in Adalberto United Methodist Church in Chicago.
80
 Ms. Arel-
lano had previously been granted a stay of deportation after a private relief bill 
was introduced in the Senate in 2003, citing the medical needs of her seven-year-
old son Saul, a citizen.
81
  Although similar bills had been introduced in the 
House, they had not yet been acted upon when Ms. Arellano received an order 
to report from the Department of Homeland Security.
82
 The church’s pastor jus-
tiﬁed helping Ms. Arellano on religious grounds: “There’s a tradition in this 
country as well as around the world that governments respect the dignity and 
the faith of the church and don’t trample on that . . . . I’m much more afraid of 
God than I am of Homeland Security.”
83
 In May of 2007, representatives from a 




This resurgent movement mirrors the sanctuary movement of the 1980s in 
certain ways.
85
 In both cases, places of worship opened their doors to individuals 
whose immigration status exposed them to danger, both here and potentially in 
their countries of origin. While the Central American civil wars of the 1980s and 
1990s are over, gang-related violence in certain Central American countries—
particularly Honduras and El Salvador—has reached levels comparable to those 
found in war zones.
86
 It is true that the new movement is not a response to po-
litical bias in asylum law. But it has emerged from the recognition of a different 
kind of legal injustice, an immigration policy in which Congress passes laws far 
stricter than it intends to enforce, relegating over ten million individuals to a 
 
80. See YUKICH, supra note 42, at 82; Villazor, supra note 66, at 144. 
81. See Gretchen Ruethling, Chicago Woman’s Stand Stirs Immigration Debate, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 




84. See Villazor, supra note 66, at 144; Kara L. Wild, The New Sanctuary Movement: When Moral 
Mission Means Breaking the Law, and the Consequences for Churches and Illegal Immigrants, 50 
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 981, 995-96 (2010). 
85. See YUKICH, supra note 42, at 85-88; Wild, supra note 84, at 996-97. 
86. See Kuang Keng Kuek Ser, Map: Here Are Countries with the World’s Highest Murder Rates, PUB. 
RADIO INT’L (June 27, 2016, 2:45 EDT), https://www.pri.org/stories/2016-06-27/map 
-here-are-countries-worlds-highest-murder-rates [https://perma.cc/8QNP-WNZL]. For 
example, these homicide rates approach levels of violence during some of the years of El 
Salvador’s civil war. See WOOD, supra note 22, at 8-9 (displaying that for several years, the 
rates of war-related deaths were around 4,000 out of a total population of 5 million, or 80 per 
100,000). 




 The movement has often focused on keeping families to-
gether, particularly in cases where the children are U.S. citizens, for whom the 
consequences of separation can be devastating.
88
 
Another feature of the NSM is that congregations will usually make known 
that they are providing sanctuary. The movement argues this openness limits the 
churches’ potential liability under the federal antiharboring statute.
89
 Commen-
tators are divided on the validity of this interpretation of the statute.
90
 Sanctuary 
congregations, however, have not publicly argued that religious freedom could 
provide greater legal protection now than it did in the 1980s, and commentators 
have generally assumed that requests for religious exemptions would fare the 
same today as in previous times.
91
  News stories on sanctuary often say the 
same.
92
 Yet these past three decades have seen signiﬁcant shifts in both the law 
and politics of claims by religious persons for exemptions from neutral laws of 
general applicability. This shift raises new possibilities for RFRA claims by the 
NSM or other congregations interested in sanctuary. 
i i .  the shifting sands of religious freedom  
The sanctuary cases of the 1980s arose during a period in which religious 
freedom jurisprudence was in ﬂux, both in doctrine and application. The sanc-
tuary decisions of the Fifth and Ninth Circuits reﬂected a particular conception 
 
87. See infra note 249 and accompanying text. 
88. See, e.g., Paola Benefo, What It’s Like to Have Your Parents Deported, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 27, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/27/opinion/what-its-like-to-have-your-parents 
-deported.html [https://perma.cc/4B5N-48SZ]; Villazor, supra note 66, at 145-46. 
89. See Villazor, supra note 66, at 146-47. 
90. See id. For those arguing this is a correct reading of § 1324, see Gregory A. Loken & Lisa R. 
Babino, Harboring, Sanctuary and the Crime of Charity Under Federal Immigration Law, 28 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 119, 142 (1993); and Breslin, supra note 44, at 242. For commentators 
arguing that sanctuary violates § 1324, see Pamela Begaj, An Analysis of Historical and Legal 
Sanctuary and a Cohesive Approach to the Current Movement, 42 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 135, 160 
(2008); and Wild, supra note 84, at 1006. 
91. See, e.g., YUKICH, supra note 42, at 75 (“In the United States, sanctuary has no legal grounds: 
it never has.”); Victoria J. Avalon, The Lazarus Effect: Could Florida’s Religious Freedom Resto-
ration Act Resurrect Ecclesiastical Sanctuary?, 30 STETSON L. REV. 663, 700 (2000); Begaj, supra 
note 90, at 160; Michael J. Davidson, Sanctuary: A Modern Legal Anachronism, 42 CAP. U. L. 
REV. 583, 615 (2014); Marie A. Failinger, “No More Deaths”: On Conscience, Civil Disobedience, 
and a New Role for Truth Commissions, 75 UMKC L. REV. 401, 435 (2006). 
92. See, e.g., Jason Hanna, Can Churches Provide Legal Sanctuary to Undocumented Immigrants?, 
CNN (Feb. 17, 2017, 10:27 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2017/02/17/us/immigrants 
-sanctuary-churches-legality-trnd/index.html [https://perma.cc/Q4KH-SR79]. 
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of requests for religious exemptions. To reiterate the courts’ views, they held that 
there should not be an exception made for individual religious exercise that in-
terferes in an area of comprehensive, neutral government regulation, especially 
when that regulation is enforced by criminal sanctions. At the time these deci-
sions came down, that view of religious freedom was one of several readings of 
the Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence. It would soon become the 




To properly understand how a claim for a sanctuary exception to criminal 
harboring laws might fare in the present day, one must ﬁrst understand the rap-
idly shifting legal and political context of religious exemptions. In this Part, I 
will discuss the evolution of free exercise doctrine, both constitutional and stat-
utory, from the ﬁrst sanctuary movement to the present day. 
A. From Smith to RFRA in Three Short Years 
During the 1980s, official doctrine held that neutral laws of general applica-
bility would receive some form of heightened scrutiny when they imposed a bur-
den on an individual’s religious exercise. This standard came out of a series of 
decisions by progressive civil libertarians to protect the rights of unpopular or 




 and Seventh-day 
Adventists.
96
 This doctrine dates back to the Supreme Court’s famous reversal 
in its decisions on the right of Jehovah’s Witness schoolchildren to refuse to sa-
lute the ﬂag. In Minersville School District v. Gobitis, the Court denied them this 
right.
97
 Yet just three years later, after witnessing the violent reprisals against 
Jehovah’s Witnesses, the Court reversed itself in West Virginia State Board of Ed-
ucation v. Barnette.
98
 Subsequent decisions articulated a test commonly referred 




93. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
94. See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
95. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
96. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
97. 310 U.S. 586 (1940). 
98. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642 (overturning Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586); see SHAWN FRANCIS PETERS, 
JUDGING JEHOVAH’S WITNESSES: RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION AND THE DAWN OF THE RIGHTS 
REVOLUTION 8-16 (2000); Robert L. Tsai, Reconsidering Gobitis: An Exercise in Presidential 
Leadership, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 363, 373 (2008). 
99. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403. 
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the Sherbert test, neutral laws of general applicability should not burden individ-
ual free exercise unless they further a compelling state interest. In essence, reli-
gious persons should receive an accommodation when a law imposes an unnec-
essary disparate impact on their ability to practice their faiths. 
Yet the Fifth and Ninth Circuits in the sanctuary cases correctly sensed the 
shifting winds. By the end of the 1980s, religious accommodation claims would 
suffer the same fate as several other progressive judicial expansions of rights. In 
1986, the Court denied a Jewish military doctor’s request to be allowed to wear 
a yarmulke at his job.
100
 The very next year, the Court declined to apply Sherbert 
in the prison context to a claim brought by Muslim inmates.
101
 In 1988, the 
Court rejected a religious accommodation claim by Native Americans who 
sought protection of a forest that they had traditionally used for religious pur-
poses.
102
 In each case, Justices Brennan, Blackmun, and Marshall dissented. Jus-
tice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, stated the objection succinctly: 
“[U]nder the guise of neutrality and evenhandedness, majority religions are fa-
vored over distinctive minority faiths.”
103 
Then, in 1990, the Court in Smith held that neutral laws of general applica-
bility burdening religion should receive no more than rational-basis review—the 
lowest form of judicial scrutiny.
104
 Addressing a claim raised by Native Ameri-
cans who ceremonially used peyote, Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, quoted 
Gobitis approvingly: “Conscientious scruples have not, in the course of the long 
struggle for religious toleration, relieved the individual from obedience to a gen-
eral law not aimed at the promotion or restriction of religious beliefs.”
105
 To al-
low such exemptions was “in effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto 
himself,”
106
 which would be especially problematic in the area of criminal law.
107
 
This would be “anarchy.”
108
 On the one hand, Justice Scalia was careful to ex-
plain that just as classiﬁcations based on race are subject to “the most exacting 
scrutiny,” “governmental classiﬁcations based on religion” should also be 
“strictly scrutinize[d].”
109
 On the other hand, he wrote that just as “race-neutral 
 
100. Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 509-10 (1986). 
101. O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 353 (1987). 
102. Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 447-53 (1988). 
103. Goldman, 475 U.S. at 521 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
104. Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878 (1990). 
105. Id. at 879 (quoting Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 594 (1940)). 
106. Id. (citation omitted). 
107. Id. at 884. 
108. Id. at 888. 
109. Id. at 886 n.3. 
the yale law journal 128:408  2018 
426 
laws that have the effect of disproportionately disadvantaging a particular racial 
group” do not trigger strict scrutiny,
110
 neither should an effects-based standard 
be used for religion. 
While Justice Scalia acknowledged that “leaving accommodation to the po-
litical process [would] place at a relative disadvantage” less popular religions, 
this was an “unavoidable consequence of democratic government.”
111
 Justice 
Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall in dissent, intoned that 
courts must not “turn a blind eye to the severe impact of a State’s restrictions on 
the adherents of a minority religion.”
112
 Though there is no question that Smith 
represented a sea change in the letter of free exercise doctrine, its practical effect 
is more contested, as the Sherbert test had been “strict in theory but feeble in 
fact.”
113
 Nonetheless, at least in the lower courts, the success rate of free exercise 
claims diminished in Smith’s wake.
114
 
The Smith Court’s position on what truly constituted discrimination was 
emblematic of a broader conservative assault on effects-based understandings of 
antidiscrimination.
115
 As Reva Siegel has documented, during the 1980s, “the 
newly articulated constitutional distinction between purpose and effects became 
a lightning rod” for conservative arguments over antidiscrimination, both in the 
courts and Congress.
116
 According to these arguments, judicially enforced, ef-
fects-based protections in the name of antidiscrimination posed a threat to dem-
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unsuccessful before Smith). 
114. See Amy Adamczyk et al., Religious Regulation and the Courts: Documenting the Effects 
of Smith and RFRA, 46 J. CHURCH & ST. 237, 246-55 (2004). 
115. See Reva B. Siegel, The Supreme Court, 2012 Term—Foreword: Equality Divided, 127 HARV. L. 
REV. 1, 15-29 (2013) (describing conservative social, political, and legal mobilization against 
disparate impact); see also Douglas Laycock, Summary and Synthesis: The Crisis in Religious 
Liberty, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 841, 855 (1992) (attributing Smith to a pattern of conservative 
Justices retrenching judicial constitutional protections). 
116. Siegel, supra note 115, at 23. 
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Smith led to political backlash across the board—from newspapers to law re-
views, from left to right, and from political and religious ﬁgures alike.
119
 Legis-
lative efforts to restore the Sherbert test began immediately, championed by in-
ﬂuential ﬁgures in both parties such as Senators Orrin Hatch and Ted 
Kennedy.
120
 By 1993, Congress had passed the Religious Freedom Restoration 
Act with nearly full bipartisan support.
121
 The bill had been supported by a di-
verse array of groups from both the left and the right, ranging from Americans 
United for Separation of Church and State to the National Association of Evan-
gelicals.
122
 Ironically, while the Supreme Court had warned that religious ex-
emptions in our diverse society might produce divisiveness,
123
 in the early 1990s 




The only major political holdouts at the outset were the Catholic Church and 
other pro-life groups. They worried that RFRA would potentially expand 
women’s access to abortions. With President George H.W. Bush’s appointment 
of two new Justices to the Court, these groups thought they saw the end of Roe 
v. Wade
125
 on the horizon. With Roe gone, laws would be passed to signiﬁcantly 
limit access to abortions. Their concern about RFRA was that women, particu-
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ways: A Comment on Owen Fiss’s Brennan Lecture, 106 CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) 
(manuscript at 116) (on ﬁle with author). 
119. Ryan, supra note 113, at 1409 (documenting the backlash). See also infra Section IV.A for a 
longer discussion of the many critiques of Smith surrounding the passage of RFRA. 
120. Ryan, supra note 113, at 1411 n.29. 
121. Actions Overview H.R.1308—103rd Congress (1993-1994), CONGRESS.GOV, https://www 
.congress.gov/bill/103rd-congress/house-bill/1308/actions [https://perma.cc/M5BJ 
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123. Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 888 (1990). 
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Amendment scholars either supported Smith, see William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith and 
Free Exercise Revisionism, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 308 (1991), or opposed RFRA, see Eisgruber & 
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larly some Jewish women,
126
 could bring claims under RFRA to access abor-
tions.
127
 This debate occupied dozens of pages of the legislative history and de-
layed the passage of the bill for years.
128
 Only after Planned Parenthood of South-
eastern Pennsylvania v. Casey
129
 and Clinton’s election had dampened the hopes 




As a piece of legislation, RFRA is remarkable both for its brevity and its 
structure. The law is only three pages long.
131
 The text notes the importance of 
the “free exercise of religion as an unalienable right” and explains that “laws 
‘neutral’ toward religion may burden religious exercise as surely as laws intended 
to interfere with religious exercise.”
132
 The Court’s decision in Smith, however, 
“virtually eliminated the requirement that the government justify burdens on 
religious exercise imposed by laws neutral toward religion.”
133
 Congress found 
that the Court’s pre-Smith jurisprudence had set forth a “workable test for strik-
ing sensible balances between religious liberty and competing prior governmen-
tal interests.”
134
 The statute therefore required that government action could 
substantially burden a person’s sincere exercise of religion only if that burden 
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claims. This was resolved in large part by explicitly writing in Article III standing require-
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the Establishment Clause was unaffected. H.R. REP. NO. 103-88, at 8-9 (1993). 
131. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (codiﬁed as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (2018)). 
132. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(1)-(2). 
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134. Id. § 2000bb(a)(5). 
135. Id. § 2000bb-1(b)(1)-(2). 
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therefore imposed heightened scrutiny on the government at every level—fed-
eral, state, and local.
136
 As applied to the federal government, RFRA was justiﬁed 
as an exercise of Congress’s authority to supervise federal agencies and provide 
“rule[s] of interpretation for future federal legislation”; its application to the 
states was justiﬁed as an exercise of Congress’s enforcement power under Sec-
tion 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
137
 
B. Back from the Grave: From Boerne to Hobby Lobby 
RFRA did not have a smooth landing. A dispute over a zoning ordinance 
governing historic landmarks in the small town of Boerne, Texas led the Su-
preme Court to declare RFRA an invalid exercise of Congress’s Section 5 
power.
138
 The Court held that Congress’s power under Section 5 extended only 
to “remedial” or “preventative” measures targeting unconstitutional action.
139
 
Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, declared that “RFRA cannot be consid-
ered remedial, preventive legislation, if those terms are to have any meaning.”
140
 
RFRA’s “sweeping coverage” was “out of proportion to a supposed remedial or 
preventive object” and would create “intrusion at every level of government, dis-
placing laws and prohibiting official actions of almost every description and re-
gardless of subject matter.”
141
 While proof that a “state law disproportionately 
burdened a particular class of religious observers . . . might be evidence of an 
impermissible legislative motive,” Justice Kennedy wrote, citing Washington v. 
Davis, “RFRA’s substantial-burden test, however, is not even a discriminatory-
effects or disparate-impact test.”
142
 RFRA, as applied to states, was therefore un-
constitutional.
143
 Since RFRA’s effect on the federal government was not part of 
 
136. § 5, 107 Stat. at 1489 (“[T]he term ‘government’ includes a branch, department, agency, in-
strumentality, and official (or other person acting under color of law) of the United States, a 
State, or a subdivision of a State.”). 
137. See Laycock & Thomas, supra note 122, at 211. 
138. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
139. Id. at 524. 
140. Id. at 532. 
141. Id. 
142. Id. at 535 (citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241 (1976)). This statement is subject to 
multiple interpretations, but likely reﬂected a speciﬁc vision of disparate impact, not as a rem-
edy for structural inequality, but as a proxy for improper intent. See Reva B. Siegel, Discrimi-
nation in the Eyes of the Law: How “Color Blindness” Discourse Disrupts and Rationalizes Social 
Stratiﬁcation, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 77, 95-96 (2000) (describing different readings of disparate 
impact protections). 
143. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536. 
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the holding in Boerne, its application to federal law survived. Nonetheless, RFRA 
claims appear to have enjoyed little success in federal courts during this pe-
riod.
144
 Thus, in 1998, one scholar declared RFRA “all but dead.”
145
 
Yet a renewed push for a legislative override was underway. Initial efforts to 
reenact RFRA’s broad protections under the Commerce or Spending Clause fell 
short.
146
 This approach had faced not only the legal obstacle of Boerne, but also 
political headwinds. While a bipartisan coalition had supported a broad RFRA 
in 1993, by the end of the decade, civil rights groups were growing concerned 
about attempts to secure religious exceptions from state antidiscrimination 
laws.
147
 Instead, in 2000, Congress passed the Religious Land Use and Institu-
tionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA)
148
 with unanimous support in both houses.
149
 
The statute restored the RFRA test for areas where patterns of disparate impact, 
misuse of discretion, and pretextual justiﬁcations were well documented—the 
rights of incarcerated persons and zoning laws—the former of which involved a 
clearly subordinate group while the latter affected all faiths but disproportion-
ately burdened minority ones.
150
  In so doing, Congress had “narrowed the 
sweep of the legislation to those areas of law where the congressional record of 
religious discrimination and discretionary burden was the strongest.”
151
 This 
limited scope partly reﬂected the Supreme Court’s concerns in Boerne and partly 
reﬂected civil rights groups’ worries about overbroad protections.
152
 In a 2005 
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the Senate). 
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743, 780-81, 789 (1998). 
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case brought by prisoners of “nonmainstream” faiths, a unanimous Supreme 
Court upheld the constitutionality of RLUIPA.
153
 
Since then, the protections afforded by RFRA and RLUIPA have expanded 
through the case law, while the bipartisan consensus over religious exceptions 
has frayed through the culture-war debates. In 2006 in Gonzales v. O Centro 
Espirita Beneﬁcente Uniao do Vegetal, the Supreme Court unanimously affirmed a 
grant of a preliminary injunction against criminal prosecution for a small reli-
gious sect that used a hallucinogenic sacramental tea.
154
 In Holt v. Hobbs,
155
 a 
Muslim inmate challenged an Arkansas Department of Correction regulation 
that forbade him from growing a half-inch beard.
156
 In 2015, the Court again 
ruled unanimously for the prisoner, though both Justices Ginsburg and So-
tomayor concurred to comment on the limits of religious exemptions.
157
 In ex-
plaining her position, Justice Ginsburg distinguished a recent case that, as much 
as anything else, helps to symbolize the political ﬁssures within the area of reli-
gious exemptions: Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.
158
 
In Hobby Lobby, closely held family companies sued the federal government 
for exceptions to regulations under the Affordable Care Act (ACA), which man-
dated that for-proﬁt employers offer health plans that included contracep-
tives.
159
 This case was at the cross-currents of fraught debates over reproductive 
justice, religious freedom, gender equality, corporate personhood, and the ACA 
itself. Over a vigorous dissent by the Court’s four liberals, Justice Alito’s majority 
opinion (joined by Justice Scalia, the author of Smith, and Justice Kennedy, the 
author of Boerne) held that for-proﬁt corporations were protected by RFRA from 
having to offer such coverage.
160
 
In the wake of Hobby Lobby, conservative groups have continued proposing 
and supporting litigation across the country involving accommodations from 
laws designed to provide greater access to reproductive care or to protect LGBT 
individuals.
161
 These cases are controversial and conspicuous, and each has pro-
duced an avalanche of amicus briefs. The different sides in these briefs, penned 
 
153. Cutter, 544 U.S. at 712. 
154. Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneﬁcente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 423 (2006). 
155. 135 S. Ct. 853, 859 (2015). 
156. Id. 
157. Id. at 867 (Ginsburg, J., concurring); id. (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
158. 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
159. Id. at 2759. 
160. Id. 
161. See, e.g., Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016) (challenging a requirement to cover contra-
ceptives through health plans unless petitioners, mostly nonproﬁts, submitted a form to their 
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by former allies in the ﬁght for religious exemptions, illustrate a growing divide 
between the left and right. Echoing Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor’s caution 
in their Holt concurrences, groups dedicated to a progressive vision of religious 
freedom are calling for limitations on the doctrine—especially in cases involving 
the interplay of antidiscrimination law and risks of third-party harms.
162
 
C. Conclusion: The Current Landscape of Religious Freedom 
The recent history of religious accommodation doctrine is enough to give 
one whiplash. Today, religious exercise is afforded stronger legal protections 
than ever before. The shifting conﬁgurations of Supreme Court Justices in cases 
from Smith to Boerne to Hobby Lobby mirror a larger debate in which the modern 
conservative movement has come to embrace religious exemptions. Rhetoric has 
shifted dramatically; whereas earlier conservatives claimed a “moral majority” 
with a mandate to deﬁne the nation’s social mores, today they often speak in the 
register of an embattled minority, persecuted by an ascendant social liberal-
ism.
163
 This shift has been accompanied by growing concerns among progres-
sives that federal and state religious freedom laws shield unequal or even dis-
criminatory treatment of members of the LBGT community and women seeking 
access to reproductive care. 
The political valence of such exceptions is now essentially bifurcated. There 
is a highly contested area where religious exceptions come into conﬂict with 
other antidiscrimination principles. As these claims have become caught up in 
culture war struggles over LGBT rights and access to reproductive care, the bi-
partisan consensus over accommodation has eroded. But space exists for agree-
ment on religious protections for minority faiths or subordinate groups, charac-
terized by past unanimous votes in Congress and the Supreme Court. Indeed, 
the unanimous decision in Holt came only one year after Hobby Lobby. In Part IV, 
I discuss how a sanctuary claim could help disrupt these current partisan battle 
lines. But before we get there, I assess how a hypothetical sanctuary claim would 
fare under today’s religious freedom doctrine. 
 
insurer or the federal government stating an objection on religious grounds); EEOC v. R.G. 
&. G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 884 F.3d 560 (6th Cir. 2018) (seeking an exception from 
antidiscrimination protections to ﬁre a transgender employee); Stormans, Inc. v. Wiesman, 
794 F.3d 1064 (9th Cir. 2015) (challenging a Washington state law requiring pharmacies to 
stock emergency contraception, regardless of religious objections). 
162. See, e.g., NELSON TEBBE, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN AN EGALITARIAN AGE 67-70 (2017); Frederick 
Mark Gedicks & Rebecca G. Van Tassell, RFRA Exemptions from the Contraception Mandate: An 
Unconstitutional Accommodation of Religion, 49 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 343, 356 (2014); Doug-
las NeJaime & Reva B. Siegel, Conscience Wars: Complicity-Based Conscience Claims in Religion 
and Politics, 124 YALE L.J. 2516, 2579-91 (2015). 
163. NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 162, at 2553. 
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i i i .  a legal sanctuary 
On the legal front, a sanctuary claim would fare much better today than in 
the 1980s. RFRA’s test now consists of a front end and a back end. On the front 
end, the religious person bears the burden. That individual must demonstrate 
(1) a sincerely held religious belief that is (2) substantially burdened. On the 
back end, the government bears the burden. It must demonstrate that the bur-
dening law serves (3) a compelling government interest that is (4) achieved 
through the least restrictive means available. While this test is presented as a 
restoration of the standard applied in the 1980s, several of its key elements have 
evolved to offer stronger protections to religious exercise. The result is that a 
sanctuary claim of the sort raised in the 1980s today would likely turn out quite 
differently. Indeed, the analysis presented in this Part illustrates how cases like 
O Centro, Hobby Lobby, and (to a lesser degree) Holt have considerably strength-
ened accommodation protections from the pre-Smith era. 
In this Part, I examine how RFRA would interact with two legal questions 
central to sanctuary congregations: (A) whether RFRA would provide protec-
tion to sanctuary congregations from prosecution under federal laws criminaliz-
ing various forms of assistance to undocumented individuals, and (B) whether 
RFRA would place limits on ICE’s ability to conduct raids or surveillance of im-
migrant congregations or sanctuary churches. 
A. RFRA Protections for Sanctuary Congregations 
Federal law makes it illegal to harbor, conceal, shield, or transport undocu-
mented immigrants, or to assist or encourage them to enter or reside in the coun-
try unlawfully.
164
 It was under these provisions that sanctuary movement mem-
bers were successfully prosecuted in the 1980s. Today, however, many sanctuary 
congregations would be entitled to an exception from such laws under RFRA. 
1. RFRA and Antiharboring Laws 
Sanctuary workers in the 1980s were prosecuted primarily under subsections 
of 8 U.S.C. § 1324, which prohibit a variety of actions related to assisting noncit-
izens in entering or remaining in the country unlawfully. Today, this law remains 
essentially the same. Subsections (a)(1)(A)(i) to (a)(1)(A)(v) prohibit, in turn: 
(i) assisting a noncitizen in entering the country other than at a designated port 
of entry; (ii) transporting an illegally present noncitizen within the United 
States in furtherance of that presence; (iii) concealing, harboring, or shielding 
 
164. 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(i)-(v) (2018). 
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an illegally present noncitizen, or attempting to do so, within any place, includ-
ing a building or means of transportation; (iv) encouraging or inducing a 
noncitizen to unlawfully come, enter, or reside in the United States; and (v) con-
spiracy to commit, and aiding or abetting, the preceding acts.
165
 
A sanctuary congregation that did not help bring people into the country 
would likely avoid liability under subsections (i) and (iv) for assisting in, or in-
ducing, entry. A public sanctuary committed to honoring warrants would likely 
avoid liability under the provisions of subsection (iii) prohibiting concealing or 
shielding. However, potential liability under the other subsections would vary 
from circuit to circuit. Different circuits have given signiﬁcantly different scopes 
of liability to subsections prohibiting the transporting, harboring, or encourag-
ing of noncitizens to reside in the country. Several courts have read subsection 
(ii)’s “in furtherance of” language as applying only where there is a “direct and 
substantial relationship” between the transportation and the noncitizen’s unau-
thorized presence, which excludes instances of “incidental” transportation, such 
as driving someone to work.
166
 Some circuits, such as the Second, have found 
that, in order to constitute “harboring” under subsection (iii), an individual’s 
actions “must be intended (1) substantially to facilitate an illegal alien’s remain-
ing in the United States, and (2) to prevent the alien’s detection by immigration 
authorities.”
167
 This would appear to exclude providing public sanctuary, a po-
sition supported by some commentators and the New Sanctuary Movement it-
self.
168
 Other circuits, however, have not read this subsection so narrowly.
169
 Fi-
nally, at least one circuit, the Eleventh, has deﬁned “encouraging to reside” under 
subsection (iv) in a troublingly broad manner that would appear to encompass 
 
165. Id. 
166. For circuits that have adopted this test, see United States v. Khalil, 857 F.3d 137, 140 (2d Cir. 
2017); United States v. Stoneﬁsh, 402 F.3d 691, 695 (6th Cir. 2005); United States v. Velasquez-
Cruz, 929 F.2d 420, 422-24 (8th Cir. 1991); and United States v. Moreno, 561 F.2d 1321, 1322-23 
(9th Cir. 1977). However, the Tenth Circuit deﬁnes the act of furtherance broadly as meaning 
“help, advance, or promote.” United States v. Barajas-Chavez, 162 F.3d 1285, 1288 (10th Cir. 
1999). 
167. United States v. George, 779 F.3d 113, 118 (2d Cir. 2015). 
168. Loken & Babino, supra note 90, at 142; Wild, supra note 84, at 998. 
169. See United States v. Jimenez, 391 F. App’x 818, 818 (11th Cir. 2010); United States v. Balderas, 
91 F. App’x 354, 355 (5th Cir. 2004); United States v. Rubio-Gonzalez, 674 F.2d 1067, 1071-72 
(5th Cir. 1982). In one of the sanctuary cases, the Ninth Circuit adopted a similarly expansive 
reading of “harboring.” United States v. Aguilar, 883 F.2d 662, 690 (9th Cir. 1989). However, 
more recent decisions in that circuit have cast doubt on the continuing validity of that inter-
pretation. See, e.g., United States v. You, 382 F.3d 958, 962, 966 (9th Cir. 2004). 
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a vast range of potentially charitable conduct for undocumented individuals.
170
 
There are compelling arguments that none of these subsections should properly 
be applied to a congregation that publicly provides sanctuary. These arguments, 
however, did not prevail in the 1980s, nor are they consistent with some of the 
more punitive interpretations later courts have given to § 1324. Indeed, the Sev-
enth Circuit recently noted that sanctuary churches would exemplify a violation 
of the prohibition on harboring an illegally present noncitizen.
171
 
However, the prohibitions of § 1324 must now be read in light of RFRA. 
RFRA applies “to all Federal law, and the implementation of that law, whether 
statutory or otherwise, and whether adopted before or after November 16, 
1993.”
172
 Although there are different ways of characterizing RFRA’s interaction 
with the rest of the U.S. Code, the functional effect remains the same: it applies 
to all federal law unless speciﬁcally exempted.
173
 
Another reason that a RFRA claim would fare better today than free exercise 
claims did in the 1980s is that RFRA is a congressionally mandated “amend-
ment” or “rule of interpretation.” In the sanctuary cases of the 1980s, courts cited 
the broad power of Congress and the executive over the ﬁeld of immigration law 
to argue for narrow judicial review.
174
 Under traditional plenary power doctrine, 
the level of scrutiny given to constitutional claims is reduced in the context of 
exclusion and sometimes expulsion of immigrants.
175
 However, even if plenary 
 
170. For narrower deﬁnitions, see United States v. Borrero, 771 F.3d 973, 979 (7th Cir. 2014); United 
States v. Thum, 749 F.3d 1143, 1144 (9th Cir. 2014); and DelRio-Mocci v. Connolly Properties Inc., 
672 F.3d 241, 249 (3d Cir. 2012). The Eleventh Circuit is an outlier in adopting a broad reading 
of “encouragement” that includes actions that merely “help” an undocumented individual re-
side in the United States. United States v. Lopez, 590 F.3d 1238, 1249-51 (11th Cir. 2009). The 
Fourth Circuit’s standard is unclear, but may be somewhere in between. See United States v. 
Oloyede, 982 F.2d 133, 137 (4th Cir. 1992). 
171. See United States v. Costello, 666 F.3d 1040, 1047 (7th Cir. 2012). 
172. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-3(a) (2018). 
173. Compare Rweyemamu v. Cote, 520 F.3d 198, 202 (2d Cir. 2008) (describing RFRA as an 
amendment to the entire U.S. Code), with Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654, 673 (7th Cir. 2013) 
(explaining that “RFRA is structured as a ‘sweeping “super-statute,” cutting across all other 
federal statutes (now and future, unless speciﬁcally exempted) and modifying their reach’” 
(quoting Michael Stokes Paulsen, A RFRA Runs Through It: Religious Freedom and the U.S. 
Code, 56 MONT. L. REV. 249, 253 (1995))). 
174. See Aguilar, 883 F.2d at 695 (remarking that the Supreme Court “has long recognized the 
power to expel or exclude aliens as a fundamental sovereign attribute exercised by the Gov-
ernment’s political departments largely immune from judicial control” (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (quoting Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 210 
(1953))). 
175. See Adam B. Cox, Immigration Law’s Organizing Principles, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 341, 347-49 
(2008). 
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power doctrine were to apply to a RFRA claim brought by a sanctuary congre-
gation—which is itself debatable
176
—it would not reduce the legislatively man-
dated level of scrutiny. 
Plenary power doctrine is justiﬁed by a theory of judicial deference to Con-
gress and, to a certain degree, to the executive.
177
 Yet, because RFRA’s height-
ened scrutiny is statutorily mandated, its least-restrictive-means test represents 
the judgment of Congress. As the Supreme Court noted, “RFRA makes clear that 
it is the obligation of the courts to consider whether exceptions are required un-
der the test set forth by Congress.”
178
 Accordingly, courts have interpreted RFRA 
as applying a uniform level of scrutiny even in areas where courts traditionally 








2. Sincere Exercise by a Religious Person 
For RFRA’s protections to apply, a religious person must be engaged in sin-
cere religious exercise. Most bona ﬁde sanctuary congregations would have little 




The standard for whether conduct qualiﬁes as a religious exercise is expan-
sive and includes conduct that is neither compelled by nor central to a person’s 
faith.
183
  Congregations providing sanctuary would certainly qualify. As one 
 
176. In the immigration context, an equal protection claim brought on behalf of an alleged U.S. 
citizen does not receive reduced scrutiny. See Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 
1693-94 (2017). 
177. See Fiallo ex rel. Rodriguez v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792, 796 (1977); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 
U.S. 753, 765-70 (1972) (describing Congress as having delegated plenary power to the exec-
utive). 
178. Gonzalez v. O Centro Espirita Beneﬁcente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 434 (2006) (emp-
hasis added). 
179. O Centro Espirita Beneﬁcente Uniao do Vegetal v. Ashcroft, 282 F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1254 
(D.N.M. 2002), aff’d, 342 F.3d 1170 (10th Cir. 2003), aff’d, 389 F.3d 973 (10th Cir. 2004) (en 
banc), aff’d sub nom. Gonzalez v. O Centro Espirita Beneﬁcente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 
418 (2006). 
180. See United States v. Sterling, 75 M.J. 407, 410, 414 (C.A.A.F. 2016). 
181. See Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 859 (2015). 
182. See O Centro, 546 U.S. 418. 
183. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2762 (2014). 
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court recently noted, “the concept of acts of charity as an essential part of reli-
gious worship is a central tenet of all major religions.”
184
 Scriptural support for 
a duty to help those in need can be found across various religious texts.
185
 One 
district court in the 1980s found that a Roman Catholic who had helped 
transport and house refugees from El Salvador was exercising a religious be-
lief.
186
 More recently, in 2002, the Second Circuit faced a case involving a New 
York City church’s provision of “outdoor sanctuary” to homeless people.
187
 The 
church, in an effort to help the homeless, provided them with access to its prop-
erty as a form of shelter.
188
 The City, alleging ongoing violations of a number of 
local codes,
189
 sent in the NYPD to arrest and eject the homeless persons.
190
 
When the church sued under the Free Exercise Clause, the city argued “that al-
 
184. W. Presbyterian Church v. Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 862 F. Supp. 538, 544 (D.D.C. 1994). 
185. See, e.g., Deuteronomy 10:18-19 (Jewish Publication Society Tanakh) (“For the LORD your 
God is God supreme and Lord supreme, the great, the mighty, and the awesome God, who 
shows no favor and takes no bribe, but upholds the cause of the fatherless and the widow, and 
befriends the stranger, providing him with food and clothing.—You too must befriend the 
stranger, for you were strangers in the land of Egypt.”); Leviticus 19:33-34 (Jewish Publication 
Society Tanakh) (“When a stranger resides with you in your land, you shall not wrong him. 
The stranger who resides with you shall be to you as one of your citizens; you shall love him 
as yourself, for you were strangers in the land of Egypt: I the LORD am your God.”); Matthew 
25:37-40 (New International) (“Then the righteous will answer him, ‘Lord, when did we see 
you hungry and feed you, or thirsty and give you something to drink? When did we see you 
a stranger and invite you in, or needing clothes and clothe you? When did we see you sick or 
in prison and go to visit you?’ The King will reply, ‘Truly I tell you, whatever you did for one 
of the least of these brothers and sisters of mine, you did for me.’”); Mosiah, in THE BOOK OF 
MORMON 4:16 (“And also, ye yourselves will succor those that stand in need of your succor; 
ye will administer of your substance unto him that standeth in need; and ye will not suffer 
that the beggar putteth up his petition to you in vain, and turn him out to perish.”); THE 
QUR’AN 2:177 (Sahih International) (“[R]ighteousness is [in] one who believes in Allah, the 
Last Day, the angels, the Book, and the prophets and gives wealth, in spite of love for it, to 
relatives, orphans, the needy, the traveler, [and] those who ask [for help] . . . .” (second, third, 
and fourth alterations in original)). 
186. See United States v. Elder, 601 F. Supp. 1574, 1577 (S.D. Tex. 1985). 
187. Fifth Ave. Presbyterian Church v. City of New York, 293 F.3d 570, 574-75 (2d Cir. 2002). Here, 
the Second Circuit affirmed a preliminary injunction, prohibiting the city from entering 
church property to arrest homeless individuals. The district court later issued a permanent 
injunction and granted summary judgment for the church. See Fifth Ave. Presbyterian Church 
v. City of New York, No. 01 Civ. 11943(LLM), 2004 WL 2471406 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 29, 2004), 
aff’d, 177 F. App’x 198 (2d Cir. 2006). 
188. Fifth Ave. Presbyterian, 293 F.3d at 572. 
189. Id. at 573. 
190. Id. 
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lowing homeless persons to sleep outside . . . does not constitute legitimate reli-
gious conduct.”
191
 The church replied that it was “commanded by scripture to 
care for the least, the lost, and the lonely of this world” and that in ministering 
to the homeless, it was “giving the love of God . . . . There is perhaps no higher 
act of worship for a Christian.”
192
 The Second Circuit panel sided unanimously 
with the church.
193
 Other courts have routinely found provision of care to the 
needy or homeless to be religious exercise.
194
 None of these precedents will be as 
important as what a given congregation believes, of course. But for various faith 
traditions, the provision of sanctuary would have historical and theological ped-
igree. 
RFRA also requires that religious exercise be sincere. Because of concerns 
about acting as “inquisitors,” courts are reluctant to adjudicate sincerity, and in-
deed government defendants raise it only rarely.
195
 When contested, sincerity is 
a factual determination and will turn heavily on the individuals involved.
196
 
Courts tend to only infer insincerity in extreme instances.
197
 Nonetheless, if 
plaintiffs appear opportunistic, in practice, this can sometimes undermine their 
claims at other stages of the RFRA analysis.
198
 If a sanctuary congregation seems 
to be motivated by politics primarily—as critics of the movement have long 
maintained
199
—this might prejudice the claim even outside of the speciﬁc sin-
cerity analysis. There is an important conceptual difference between the political 
action of civil disobedience and a claim for legal accommodation. Yet an accom-
modation claim should not be denied simply because religious exercise overlaps 
with politics.
200
 It is at the core of an accommodation claim that one must dis-
obey an unjust law because one cannot in good conscience comply. 
 
191. Id. at 574. 
192. Id. at 574-75 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
193. Id. at 576. 
194. See Harbor Missionary Church Corp. v. City of San Buenaventura, 642 F. App’x 726, 729-30 
(9th Cir. 2016); World Outreach Conference Ctr. v. City of Chicago, 591 F.3d 531, 537 (7th 
Cir. 2009); W. Presbyterian Church v. Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 862 F. Supp. 538, 544-46 
(D.D.C. 1994). 
195. See Frederick Mark Gedicks, “Substantial” Burdens: How Courts May (and Why They Must) 
Judge Burdens on Religion Under RFRA, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 94, 98 (2017). 
196. See United States v. Quaintance, 608 F.3d 717, 721 (10th Cir. 2010). 
197. See, e.g., id. at 722. 
198. See Nathan S. Chapman, Adjudicating Religious Sincerity, 92 WASH. L. REV. 1185, 1215-20 
(2017). 
199. See Begaj, supra note 90, at 159. 
200. See Callahan v. Woods, 658 F.2d 679, 684-85 (9th Cir. 1981). 
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The question may be better framed as whether the religious person in ques-
tion is engaging in the conduct primarily to expose the injustice of a law or state 
action. In the case of the ﬁrst sanctuary movement, there is little doubt that some 
actors were motivated by a desire to bring attention to the U.S. government’s 
foreign policy. But their primary goal was to help thousands escape the reach of 
horriﬁc violence. The fact that they sought to publicize the plight of those indi-
viduals can hardly be invalidating. Consider faith-based groups like No More 
Deaths, which leave stashes of water and food in particularly dangerous areas 
along the U.S.-Mexico border. According to best estimates, hundreds of mi-
grants die each year attempting the perilous crossing of the deserts along the 
border.
201
 In placing these supplies, these groups may come into conﬂict with 
federal laws regarding what individuals can do in a protected desert. Indeed, the 
government has begun to prosecute members of these groups under this theo-
ry.
202
 Does providing potentially life-saving supplies to human beings in need 
cease to be religious exercise if No More Deaths criticizes government policy? 
Similarly, the day-to-day experience of sanctuary is marked by the develop-
ment of meaningful relationships between those involved, far from any media 
attention.
203
 To the extent that congregations are motivated by concern for the 
person in question, not merely the politics, they have a legitimate claim to sincere 
exercise. 
3. Substantial Burden 
The second element of the front-end test is whether the government action 
in question places a “substantial burden” on the person’s religious exercise. The 
requirement that the burden be “substantial” was the result of legislative com-
promise to ensure the government would not have “to justify every action that 
 
201. See Missing Migrants: Tracking Deaths Along Migratory Routes, INT’L ORG. FOR MIGRATION 
(Apr. 16, 2018), https://missingmigrants.iom.int/region/americas?region=1422 [https://
perma.cc/C3U8-MQL6]. 
202. See Daniella Silva, Volunteer Arrested After Giving Food, Water to Undocumented Immigrants in 
Arizona, NBC NEWS (Jan. 23, 2018, 7:32 PM EST), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/latino
/volunteer-arrested-after-giving-food-water-undocumented-immigrants-arizona-n840386 
[https://perma.cc/QFR9-652E]. 
203. See, e.g., Esteban L. Hernandez, Undocumented Immigrant in Sanctuary at New Haven Church 
Receives Temporary Reprieve, NEW HAVEN REG. (Nov. 22, 2017, 5:38 PM EST), https://www
.nhregister.com/news/article/Undocumented-immigrant-in-sanctuary-at-New-Haven 
-12377585.php [https://perma.cc/S9BB-25FD] (describing the relationship that developed 
between the individual in sanctuary and the reverend of the church); see also YUKICH, supra 
note 42 at 85-88 (describing the close relationship between an individual receiving sanctuary 
support in the form of accompaniments to his immigration check-ins and the congregation). 
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has some effect on religious exercise.”
204
 As the other requirements of the front-
end test have become less demanding, courts seeking to avoid RFRA claims be-




There is an intuitive argument that applying § 1324’s antiharboring require-
ments to a sanctuary congregation would burden its ability to perform what they 
see as an act of religious charity. It would mean that when a family arrives at the 
church door, the church is required to turn them away. Sanctuary congregations 
argue that this is something their faith does not permit them to do. They cannot, 
consistent with their beliefs, turn away a person in need like Ms. Chavarria. In 




Where exactly the substantial burden test stands (and should stand) after 
Hobby Lobby is hotly contested. Some commentators argue that only the penalty 
for violating the law should be taken into account.
207
 Others argue that doing so 
would essentially render religious persons the judges of their own claims, as Jus-
tice Scalia argued in Smith, since few laws impose trivial penalties.
208
 Mirroring 
the scholarly disagreement, different circuits have adopted different deﬁnitions 
of substantial burden under RFRA.
209
 So far, the Supreme Court has declined to 
further deﬁne the substantial burden standard. Given its centrality to the RFRA 
analysis, this question cannot be deferred indeﬁnitely. 
In Part IV, I discuss how substantial burden analysis relates to the values un-
derlying accommodation claims and where limits should be set. Sanctuary, how-
ever, does not present the dilemmas that have generated much of the debate, 
 
204. 139 CONG. REC. 26180 (1993); Gedicks, supra note 195, at 118-22. 
205. Michael A. Helfand, Identifying Substantial Burdens, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 1771, 1777. 
206. Of course, providing sanctuary does not always begin with an individual showing up on a 
church’s doorstep unannounced. But the point remains the same even when the congregation 
announces its status as a sanctuary church, since that very announcement simply states its 
position that it would not turn anyone away. 
207. See Helfand, supra note 205, at 1793 n.130. 
208. See Gedicks, supra note 195, at 113-14. 
209. Compare Jolly v. Coughlin, 76 F.3d 468, 477 (2d Cir. 1996) (quoting Thomas v. Review Bd. of 
Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981)) (deﬁning a substantial burden as a situation 
where “the state puts substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate 
his beliefs” (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted)), with Navajo Nation v. U.S. 
Forest Serv., 535 F.3d 1058, 1069-70 (9th Cir. 2008) (deﬁning substantial burden as only two 
situations: when a person is forced “to choose between following the tenets of their religion 
and receiving a governmental beneﬁt,” or “coerced to act contrary to their religious beliefs by 
the threat of civil or criminal sanctions” (emphasis added)). 
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such as causal attenuation, complicity claims, and concerns surrounding the im-
portance of the religious belief to the adherent.
210
 Rather, bringing a felony pros-
ecution against someone for an act of religious charity would count as a substan-
tial burden under any of the available deﬁnitions. 
The substantial burden analyses in the sanctuary cases of the 1980s are thus 
incompatible with RFRA. The Fifth Circuit held that sanctuary movement 
members could not show that prosecution under § 1324 was a substantial bur-
den, since (on the testimony of other members of their faiths) providing sanc-
tuary was not required by their faiths. Rather, per the Fifth Circuit, sanctuary 
amounted to a choice. RFRA, however, does not require that a particular exercise 
be compelled, nor that the individual’s beliefs be shared by other members of 
the faith.
211
 Nor is it a sufficient defense that while the government burdens one 
practice, a person has other means of practicing her faith.
212
 
4. Compelling Interest 
Once the front end of the test has been satisﬁed, the burden shifts to the 
government to demonstrate “that application of the burden to the person—(1) 
is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least re-
strictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.”
213
 The ex-
istence of a compelling interest is generally (though not always)
214
 addressed 
ﬁrst. If the government is unable to meet its burden, a court will rule for the 
religious person,
215
 in this case, the sanctuary congregation. 
As noted above, the Fifth and Ninth Circuits in the 1980s found that the 
government satisﬁed the compelling interest requirement, since the government 
had an interest in the general and uniform regulation of immigration. While this 
analysis may be consistent with the conception of religious exemptions that the 
 
210. See Gedicks, supra note 195, at 125-27. For further discussion, see infra Part IV. 
211. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2762 (2014) (discussing how Con-
gress “deﬁned the ‘exercise of religion’ to include ‘any exercise of religion, whether or not 
compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief’”). 
212. See Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 862 (2015) (“[T]he availability of alternative means of prac-
ticing religion is a relevant consideration, but RLUIPA provides greater protection.”). As 
noted by the Court in Holt, the relevant section of RLUIPA mirrors RFRA and would thus be 
analyzed accordingly. Id. at 860. 
213. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2761 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b) (2012)). 
214. Courts sometimes begin by presuming a compelling interest and then go on to ﬁnd that the 
law is not the least restrictive means of achieving that interest. See, e.g., id. at 2780. 
215. See Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneﬁcente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 429 (2006). 
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Court articulated in Smith, it is at odds with the compelling interest test that has 
emerged from subsequent RFRA cases. 
First, assertion of a general interest in either enforcing the law or in regulat-
ing a given area is no longer sufficient. The analysis the Supreme Court under-
took in O Centro is instructive.
216
 In O Centro, a nonproﬁt corporation sought to 
use hoasca, a Schedule I controlled substance, as part of its religious rituals.
217
 
The government maintained that there was no need to assess the particulars of 
the church’s use of the substance or to weigh the impact of the exemption for 
that speciﬁc use, “because the Controlled Substances Act serves a compelling 
purpose and simply admits of no exceptions.”
218
 This is exactly the argument 
that courts adopted in the sanctuary cases.
219
 And it was categorically rejected by 
the Supreme Court in O Centro: “RFRA requires the Government to demon-
strate that the compelling interest test is satisﬁed through application of the chal-
lenged law ‘to the person’—the particular claimant whose sincere exercise of re-
ligion is being substantially burdened.”
220
Assertions of a general interest will be 
insufficient, even where that interest is “paramount,” as with controlled sub-
stances or the education of children.
221
 
Second, a preexisting religious exception to § 1324 further undermines a 
claim that the government has a compelling interest in denying an accommoda-
tion for sanctuary. In O Centro, the existence of a statutory exemption for peyote 
for religious use had “fatally undermine[d]” the government’s contention that 
the Act admitted no exceptions.
222
 Similarly, there is an existing exception to 
several subsections of § 1324 for actions involving undocumented missionaries 
and ministers.
223
 Under this exception, enacted in 2005,
224
 a religious nonproﬁt 
can “encourage, invite, call, allow, or enable an alien who is present in the United 
 
216. Id. at 427-30. 
217. Id. at 425. 
218. Id. at 430. 
219. See United States v. Aguilar, 883 F.2d 662, 695 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[A]ppellants invite us to 
analyze their ﬁrst amendment claim by focusing on smuggling, transporting, and harboring 
individually, requiring the government to demonstrate an overriding interest with respect to 
each. We decline this invitation.” (citation omitted)). 
220. O Centro, 546 U.S. at 430-31. 
221. Id. at 431 (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213 (1972)). 
222. Id. at 434. 
223. 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(C) (2018). 
224. Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies Ap-
propriations Act, 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-97, § 796, 119 Stat. 2120, 2165 (2005). 
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States to perform the vocation of a minister or missionary” as a volunteer.
225
 
This extends to the provision of “room, board, travel, medical assistance, and 
other basic living expenses” for the undocumented individual, so long as he or 
she “has been a member of the denomination for at least one year.”
226
 While 
preexisting exemptions do not undermine the assertion of any government in-
terest, under O Centro, this would undercut assertion of an interest in uniformity 
for its own sake.
227
 
As a brief historical aside, the story of this amendment sheds light on the 
shifting politics of religious exemptions. The amendment was introduced by for-
mer Republican Senator Bob Bennett from Utah to protect Mormon or Church 
of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (LDS) communities that worked with un-
documented missionaries.
228
 The LDS faith had experienced signiﬁcant growth 
among undocumented communities.
229
 The church requires missionary work 
for young male members and encourages its young female members to partici-
pate as well.
230
 As a result, a signiﬁcant number of its younger undocumented 
members may be working domestically as missionaries at any given time, as well 
as receiving room and board at LDS facilities. After passage of the amendment, 
anti-immigration ﬁrebrand Representative Tom Tancredo led an effort to repeal 
it, warning that places of worship could be used to shelter terrorists.
231
 Though 
Tancredo’s repeal effort was unsuccessful, one of the cosponsors of Tancredo’s 
effort was then-Representative Mike Pence, who later, as Governor of Indiana 
and then as Vice President, would vigorously defend the importance of religious 




225. § 1324(a)(1)(C). 
226. Id. 
227. For a more detailed discussion of how preexisting exemptions should be analyzed, see infra 
Section IV.B.1. 
228. See Associated Press, Foe of Illegal Immigration Attacks Bennett Legislation, SALT LAKE TRIB. 
(Nov. 15, 2005, 1:23 AM), https://archive.sltrib.com/article.php?id=3216804&itype
=NGPSID [https://perma.cc/V4HN-CBUF]; Sheena McFarland, Missionary’s Arrest Sparks 
Discussion, Fear, SALT LAKE TRIB. (Apr. 27, 2009, 3:47 PM), http://archive.sltrib.com/story
.php?ref=/News/ci_12223689 [https://perma.cc/F8L9-UWTS]. 
229. See, e.g., Jack Rodolico, Mexican, Undocumented and Mormon, ABC NEWS (May 2, 2013), 
https://abcnews.go.com/ABC_Univision/mexican-undocumented-mormon/story?id
=19091737 [https://perma.cc/N3MD-K2VB]. 
230. See Preparing to Serve, CHURCH JESUS CHRIST LATTER-DAY SAINTS, https://www.lds.org 
/callings/missionary/faqs?lang=eng [https://perma.cc/6HBR-8MTM]. 
231. See Associated Press, supra note 228. 
232. Cosponsors H.R.4321 – 109th Congress (2005-2006), CONGRESS.GOV, https://www 
.congress.gov/bill/109th-congress/house-bill/4321/cosponsors [https://perma.cc/K37M 
-6TYP]. 
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Returning to the compelling interest analysis, since a general interest in im-
migration regulation or uniformity would be insufficient, the government would 
have to show a speciﬁc compelling interest in prosecuting sanctuary congrega-
tions. While exempting sanctuary congregations from legal sanction may raise 
the administrative costs of deporting the speciﬁc individuals in sanctuary, it 
likely will not do so in all cases. The government carries an “onerous burden”
233
 
of demonstrating that sanctuary would “meaningfully compromise[]”
234
 its in-
terests. If the evidence were “in equipoise,” then prosecuting sanctuary congre-
gations would violate RFRA.
235
 If congregations were to publicly announce their 
sanctuary status—as many churches in the sanctuary movement today do—this 
practice would, if anything, lower the costs of detecting undocumented individ-
uals. Much of the New Sanctuary Movement is also committed to allowing im-
migration enforcement to enter the sanctuary so long as they have a valid judicial 
warrant
236
—and not simply one of ICE’s “administrative warrants.”
237
 The main 
cost would therefore be that of obtaining a warrant. This cost is unlikely to rise 
to the level of a sufficiently compelling interest.  
Congregations committed to refusing entry to ICE, even with a judicial war-
rant, could impose a clearer administrative burden on the government. This 
matter is still not cut and dry, however. The government has only as much inter-
est in carrying out an arrest as it would in any case where an individual is guilty 
of an ongoing civil violation, such as unlawful presence—an interest that would 
be higher if the individual in sanctuary had committed a crime.
238
 In the case of 
sanctuary for undocumented individuals, the civil violations are unlikely to be 
indeﬁnite. As was true for Elvira Arellano, who left sanctuary after a year, sanc-
tuary is not a realistic long-term option for many. The experience can be trying 
for both the individual in sanctuary, who is often stuck indoors, and the conger-
 
233. O Centro Espirita Beneﬁcente Uniao do Vegetal v. Ashcroft, 282 F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1262 
(D.N.M. 2002), aff’d, 342 F.3d 1170 (10th Cir. 2003), aff’d, 389 F.3d 973 (10th Cir. 2004) (en 
banc), aff’d sub nom. Gonzalez v. O Centro Espirita Beneﬁcente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 
418 (2006). 
234. United States v. Christie, 825 F.3d 1048, 1057 (9th Cir. 2016). 
235. O Centro, 282 F. Supp. 2d at 1262. 
236. See, e.g., Maria Clark, Local Churches Revive Sanctuary Movement, TIMES-PICAYUNE (June 9, 
2017, 11:39 AM), https://www.nola.com/nolamundo/2017/06/local_churches_revive 
_sanctuar.html [https://perma.cc/4SHL-MSQ2]. 
237. Nathan Treadwell, Fugitive Operations and the Fourth Amendment: Representing Immigrants Ar-
rested in Warrantless Home Raids, 89 N.C. L. REV. 507, 528-32 (2011) (describing the difference 
between administrative warrants and judicial warrants). 
238. See Breslin, supra note 44, at 236-38. 




 A pattern that has developed across a number of cases, including 
Ms. Chavarria’s, is that sanctuary is a momentary respite to allow an individual 
to pursue certain legal avenues before she is deported.
240
 Because Ms. Chavarria 
sought sanctuary, she was able to prepare a motion to reopen her asylum case 
and received a stay of removal.
241
 When an individual plans to remain in sanc-
tuary while pursuing legal avenues of relief, the government’s interest is merely 
that of executing punishment right away, before the individual has had the 
chance to explore various legal protections to which she may be entitled. It is a 
close question whether this is a sufficiently compelling interest, and courts might 
come out either way based on the speciﬁc facts of individual cases.
242
 
In cases where congregations refuse to honor a judicial warrant, the govern-
ment may have a compelling interest in avoiding the administrative costs posed 
by sanctuary congregations and in promptly enforcing speciﬁc deportation or-
ders. These interests are narrower than those accepted by courts in the 1980s and 
lay a foundation for a least-restrictive-means analysis that will prove even harder 
for the government to pass: the narrower the interest, the easier it is to further 
by other means. 
5. Least Restrictive Means 
If a compelling interest is shown, the government must then demonstrate 
that prosecuting sanctuary congregations represents the “least restrictive means” 
of pursuing its interest. In the words of the Supreme Court, this standard is “ex-
ceptionally demanding.”
243
 The least-restrictive-means analysis boils down to 
 
239. See Sharon Otterman, Manhattan Church Shields Guatemalan Woman from Deportation, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 28, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/28/nyregion/guatemala 
-deportation-church-sanctuary.html [https://perma.cc/269B-Q4MK]. 
240. For similar examples, see Daniel González, ICE Grants 1-Year Deportation Stay to Arizona Father 
of 5-Year-Old Battling Cancer, AZCENTRAL (Feb. 12, 2018, 7:56 PM), https://www.azcentral
.com/story/news/politics/immigration/2018/02/12/ice-grants-1-year-deportation-stay 
-jesus-berrones-father-5-year-old-battling-cancer/331701002 [https://perma.cc/PWE4 
-UD5N]; Hernandez, supra note 203; Jorgensen & del Valle, supra note 2; and Noelle Philips, 
Jeanette Vizguerra Leaves Sanctuary After 86 Days Avoiding Immigration Authorities, DENVER 
POST (May 12, 2017, 5:15 PM), https://www.denverpost.com/2017/05/12/jeanette-vizguerra 
-arturo-hernandez-garcia-stay-deportation [https://perma.cc/42Y4-U7YQ]. 
241. See Jorgensen & del Valle, supra note 2. 
242. Though appeals in these cases remain to be decided, in urgent circumstances, some district 
courts have found that immigrants’ interest in accessing determinations of their eligibility for 
relief outweighed the government’s interest in hasty removal or justiﬁed a stay of removal. 
See Calderon v. Sessions, No. 18 CIV. 5222 (PAC), 2018 WL 3677891, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 1, 
2018), appeal ﬁled, No. 18-2926 (2d Cir. Oct 3, 2018); Hamama v. Adducci, 261 F. Supp. 3d 
820, 840 (E.D. Mich. 2017), appeal ﬁled, No. 17-2171 (6th Cir. Sept. 28, 2017). 
243. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2780 (2014). 
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the question of whether there is another option, besides prosecution, by which 
the government could satisfy its compelling interest that would impose less of a 
burden on sanctuary congregations. That is, if any less restrictive alternative ex-
ists, the government must employ it. As with the other elements of a RFRA 
claim, this analysis would be highly fact speciﬁc and would differ depending on 
how sanctuary was provided. 
The easiest case would be a church that adopted the rules of the New Sanc-
tuary Movement—announcing its stance publicly and being willing to honor a 
judicial warrant. ICE could fulﬁll its interest simply by obtaining a warrant. Al-
though there would be some administrative costs associated with this process, 
those costs would be no greater than if the person had remained in their home. 
ICE’s less restrictive means would simply be to follow the procedures it would 
for any home: get a warrant. 
A church that has not publicly announced its sanctuary status but that would 
be willing to honor a judicial warrant presents a more complicated scenario. Un-
less the church were actively concealing the individual (e.g., if they kept the in-
dividual hidden in a back room), ICE could simply follow the procedures that it 
normally would in seeking to detect someone who was unlawfully present. Even 
if ICE could show that sanctuary had raised its cost of detecting the individual, 
this would not end the analysis. Under RFRA, ICE may be required to bear cer-
tain increased costs to accommodate religious exercise. 
Administrative costs will only render a potential less restrictive means infea-
sible when those costs would threaten the fundamental viability of the program 
in question. RFRA mandates that courts strike a “sensible balance[] between 
religious liberty and competing prior government interests.”
244
 But both RFRA 
and RLUIPA contemplate that the government may at times be required to 
shoulder costs to protect religious exercise.
245
 The paradigmatic case where costs 
precluded an accommodation is United States v. Lee,
246
 in which the Supreme 
Court held that exempting individuals from the general system of taxation on 
religious grounds would fundamentally compromise the program. Under Hobby 
Lobby, however, the Court explained that the “holding in Lee turned primarily 
on the special problems associated with a national system of taxation.”
247
 Rather 
than being a question of administrative cost alone, “[t]he fundamental point” 
was that “there simply [was] no less restrictive alternative to the categorical re-




244. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(5) (2018). 
245. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2781. 
246. 455 U.S. 252, 260 (1982). 
247. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2784. 
248. Id. 
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Immigration does not share the features of the national tax system that make 
it unamenable to exemptions. First and foremost, because money is fungible, 
almost anyone can ﬁnd a government program funded by their tax dollars that 
they vehemently oppose on religious grounds. And unlike the tax system, our 
modern immigration system is fundamentally characterized by laws that were 
not intended to be fully applied. Systemic underenforcement and wide prosecu-
torial discretion are already baked in. This is partly because Congress has played 
a two-faced game in which members appear tough on immigration by passing 
sweeping laws that would render millions of individuals deportable, while at the 
same time underfunding enforcement to such an extent that it would be impos-
sible to deport all of the people in violation of the current laws.
249
 This under-
funding is not merely about deﬁcits, but about sensitivity to the political reality 
that deporting all, or even large numbers, of undocumented individuals in this 
country would not be a popular position.
250
 Congress’s failure has produced a 
system that tolerates millions of undocumented individuals and will continue to 
do so, while requiring wide-ranging discretion in enforcement. This includes 
not just programs like Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals, but also thou-
sands of discretionary deferrals of enforcement and case-by-case determinations 
of deferred action and other forms of limited relief that fall short of conferring 
solid legal status.
251
 The lack of uniformity in immigration enforcement is not 
the exception; it is the rule. 
To be sure, even absent a scenario identical to Lee, there probably will be a 
point where increased costs render a potential less restrictive alternative imprac-
ticable. Nonetheless, the harms in question must be “more than a possibility” 
and not solely speculative.
252
 The nature of the costs is also relevant. Costs im-
posed on speciﬁc third parties are concerning,
253
 while costs that are “limited 
 
249. See, e.g., Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodríguez, The President and Immigration Law Redux, 125 
YALE L.J. 104, 132 (2015); Breslin, supra note 44, at 236-38. 
250. See Robert P. Jones, Not Even the Reddest States Support Deportation, ATLANTIC (Jan. 27, 2017), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/01/immigration-polling/514700 
[https://perma.cc/88N9-PHCQ]; Polling Update: Post-Election Still Little Support for Mass De-
portation, NAT’L IMMIGR. F. (Nov. 22, 2016), http://immigrationforum.org/blog/polling 
-update-post-election-still-little-support-for-mass-deportation [https://perma.cc/Y9SS 
-U9G2]. 
251. See Zuzana Cepla, Deferred Action Basics, NAT’L IMMIGR. F. (Apr. 15, 2016), https:// 
immigrationforum.org/article/deferred-action-basics [https://perma.cc/4C4S-BGPD]. 
252. Gonzalez v. O Centro Espirita Beneﬁcente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 436 (2006) (quot-
ing Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 407 (1963)). 
253. See supra note 162 and accompanying text. 
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and borne by society as a whole”
254
 can be more easily tolerated.
255
 RFRA can 
simply require the government to shoulder minor increased costs of investiga-
tion and detection.
256
  It is not plausible that ordinary costs of investigation 
would be so great that no alternative existed to charging sanctuary workers with 
felonies. 
For congregations committed to nonviolent noncompliance with judicial 
warrants, the analysis is more complex still. Though it would depend on the 
circumstances, increased costs of enforcement might be high enough to support 
ICE’s claim that prosecution is the only option. Nonetheless, when a congrega-
tion is only providing sanctuary temporarily—such as when a parent explores 
her legal avenues of relief in order to remain with a citizen child—ICE would 
have to show that it could not wait for that process to ﬁnish before removing the 
individual. While the process may take weeks or even months, this waiting pe-
riod likely does not signiﬁcantly compromise ICE’s interests. Indeed, if the per-
son turns out to be eligible for forms of affirmative relief, then no real interest 
has been compromised at all. And if congregations imposed their own limits on 
sanctuary—such as not providing sanctuary to individuals who posed public 
dangers or only providing sanctuary to individuals who had potential avenues of 
immigration relief open to them—it would be harder still to show that waiting 
this temporary period is not a less restrictive alternative. 
The existence of a preexisting religious exemption also matters. Although 
one exemption does not automatically trigger another under RFRA,
257
 the exist-
ence of an exemption for a similarly situated group is often meaningful. For ex-
ample, in Hobby Lobby, the fact that religious nonproﬁts were already exempted 
from the contraception mandate was evidence that the government had a less 
restrictive means available.
258
 Similarly—unless ICE could prove otherwise—the 
missionary exception to § 1324 is an indication that the government can pursue 
its interest of policing unauthorized presence without prosecuting religious or-
ganizations. 
The missionary exemption is, of course, not identical to a sanctuary exemp-
tion. But it is neither as narrow nor as different as it may initially appear. Both 
 
254. NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 162, at 2526. 
255. While the question of undocumented immigration’s economic effect is hotly contested, it is 
unnecessary to resolve that question here. Even if undocumented immigration in general had 
the effect of slightly lowering wages, providing sanctuary for parents who risk deportation 
and separation from their children will impose no harms on speciﬁc third parties. 
256. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2781 (2014). 
257. This will be discussed further in Section IV.B.1.b infra. 
258. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2782. 
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are religious exemptions. And both the missionary exemption and a sanctuary 
exemption would cover several of the same activities and raise the same potential 
liabilities. The distinction between whether the undocumented person is volun-
teering as a missionary or minister is irrelevant for the purposes of any asserted 
government interest.
259
 Given its requirement of missionary service, in the LDS 
context alone, the missionary exemption could potentially cover hundreds of un-
documented individuals,
260




For the same reasons as with sanctuary, the missionary exemption may make 
it marginally costlier for the government to pursue an interest in identifying and 
apprehending undocumented individuals. The existing exemption is evidence 
that despite this, the government already has a means of pursuing its immigra-
tion enforcement without prosecuting people of faith. While not dispositive, it 
weighs in favor of an accommodation when a system is already in place for grant-
ing accommodations and there is no evidence that this accommodation has 
meaningfully prevented the government from pursuing its interest. Finally, 
while some may contend that no country could function with a sanctuary accom-
modation, the judiciary of at least one other country, France, has created a hu-
manitarian exemption to its antiharboring laws.
262
 
B. RFRA as a Limit to Raids on Places of Worship 
Legal protections for sanctuary congregations might effectively shield un-
documented individuals in sanctuary from deportation, since it may be politi-
cally costly for ICE to raid sanctuaries. Even in the 1980s, when the INS was 
willing to prosecute sanctuary workers, the agency was nonetheless unwilling to 
 
259. In this sense, it is similar to the arguments the Court rejected in O Centro that the peyote 
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260. See, e.g., Rodolico, supra note 229 (explaining the difficulties that young, undocumented 
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261. If anything, providing indeﬁnite lodging and transportation to an undocumented missionary 
is a greater obstacle to immigration enforcement than providing sanctuary. And neither pro-
cess appears more disruptive to enforcement than simply renting an apartment to an undoc-
umented person. 
262. See Josh Jacobs & Sam Schechner, French Court Rules in Favor of Humanitarian Aid to Illegal 
Migrants, WALL ST. J. (July 6, 2018, 3:47 PM ET), https://www.wsj.com/articles/french 
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break into the churches themselves. However, these political costs may not al-
ways be prohibitive. During the Vietnam War, for example, law enforcement 
went into churches to arrest AWOL service members, despite the seeming polit-
ical costs of such a strategy.
263
 Thus, the possibility of ICE raiding sanctuary 
churches is not too far-fetched and ought to be examined. In this Section, I will 
explore whether any legal constraints exist on ICE’s ability to raid sanctuary 
churches or more generally conduct enforcement actions at churches with un-
documented members. 
ICE currently operates under a memorandum that imposes certain proce-
dural hurdles on its ability to conduct enforcement actions, including arrests and 
surveillance, at a variety of secular and religious “sensitive locations,” including 
places of worship and sites of religious ceremonies.
264
 The “Sensitive Locations 
Memo” is designed to ensure that, as a general rule, ICE will only carry out ar-
rests or surveillance at certain locations in exigent circumstances.
265
 The 2011 
memo builds on, and supersedes, similar memos reaching back to 1993.
266
 The 
memo states that when an enforcement action “could reasonably be viewed as 
being at or near a sensitive location,” ICE agents should consult with their supe-
riors and generally hold off unless exigent circumstances exist.
267
 So long as 
places of worship are not providing sanctuary to an individual who poses a na-
tional security threat, is termed a “dangerous felon,” presents an imminent dan-
ger to public safety, or whose freedom poses an imminent risk of destruction of 




Because the Sensitive Locations Memo is only guidance, however, it could be 
rescinded by ICE at any time and attempts to enforce it in court could face seri-
ous obstacles. I argue that RFRA would provide an enforceable substitute, im-
posing limits on ICE’s ability to conduct raids or surveillance at places of wor-
ship. While the scope of protection provided by RFRA would not be absolute, it 
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would necessitate similar “exigent circumstances” and procedures as the Sensi-
tive Locations Memo does.
269
 
The legal analysis of sincerity and free exercise are unchanged from the pre-
vious Section. Rather than repeat them here, I focus instead on the substantial 
burden analysis. A raid on sanctuary premises would undoubtedly burden a con-
gregation’s ability to exercise its religion by providing sanctuary. While the bur-
den here is less direct than charging congregation members with felonies, it 
comes close. As the Second Circuit noted in Fifth Avenue Presbyterian Church v. 
City of New York, a place of worship can hardly provide sanctuary if law enforce-
ment can simply come in and arrest those inside.
270
 On the other hand, it cannot 
be the case that any law enforcement action limiting a congregation’s ability to 
provide sanctuary—such as arresting a person prior to their arrival at the place 
of worship—constitutes a substantial burden. Here, the Sensitive Locations 
Memo itself gives an example of where the line could be drawn. It mandates that 
“special consideration” be given to enforcement actions “across the street from” 
a sensitive location.
271
 This might mean extending protections to individuals 
who are arrested immediately prior to their entrance or exit from the sanctuary—
as occurred recently in Virginia, where ICE arguably violated its own policy by 
arresting immigrants who had just left a church program that ministered to the 
homeless.
272
 At the very least, the line should be drawn at the threshold of the 
sanctuary itself, after which an intrusion of federal officers would constitute a 
substantial burden. 
Beyond the speciﬁc question of sanctuary, an ICE raid or surveillance at a 
place of worship could constitute a burden on the ability of the institution to 
provide religious services to its congregation, as well as on its congregants’ abil-
ity to practice. This is particularly true of congregations with a signiﬁcant num-
ber of immigrant members. If ICE were to park several marked vehicles outside 
of a Catholic church in an immigrant community, many congregants would stay 
 
269. For example, with respect to the harboring analysis above, if ICE were absolutely barred from 
conducting any investigation of sanctuary churches or from obtaining a warrant, sanctuary 
congregations would be hard-pressed to show that a less restrictive means was available. 
270. See 293 F.3d 570, 574-76 (2d Cir. 2002). 
271. Morton Memorandum, supra note 264, at 2. 
272. See Associated Press, ICE Agents Arrest Men Leaving Alexandria Church Shelter, U.S. NEWS & 
WORLD REP. (Feb. 16, 2017 6:34 PM), https://www.usnews.com/news/virginia/articles/2017
-02-16/ice-agents-arrest-men-leaving-alexandria-church-shelter [https://perma.cc/LV32 
-J45Z]. 




 It is hard to imagine a more direct burden on exercise than where the 
threat of arrest and deportation hangs over an undocumented couple’s ability to 
be married in a church, an undocumented parent’s ability to have her child bap-
tized at the font, or an undocumented family’s opportunity to be together at a 
loved one’s burial in the church cemetery. If surveillance interfered with a 
church’s ability to minister to its congregation, by causing a decline in attend-
ance or creating an atmosphere of fear in the church, this would surely constitute 
a burden.
274
 For similar reasons, in a case challenging INS’s surveillance of the 
sanctuary movement, a federal district court in Arizona recognized that the First 




As with prosecutions under § 1324, the government could not rely on general 
assertions of interest in immigration enforcement and would instead have to 
show a speciﬁc compelling interest in raiding a church. The compelling interest 
analysis would be similar to the one provided above: the government would have 
to show a fairly limited and particularized interest in the avoidance of certain 
administrative costs and in immediate enforcement. 
As to least restrictive means, the government’s particularized interest could 
be achieved within limitations akin to the current sensitive locations policy. After 
all, the existing policy does not provide an absolute bar to such enforcement ac-
tions at places of worship. Rather, it requires that they be undertaken only after 
a determination of exigent circumstances, such as when a threat to public safety 
is involved. The policy also imposes certain procedural requirements, such as 
sign-offs by higher government officials, which ensure greater political account-
ability. These are manageable costs. Another possibility would be for ICE to hold 
off until after the individual in sanctuary has had a meaningful chance to explore 
her options for immigration relief. While the government may have an interest 
in enforcing deportation orders, it would be hard to argue that an individual 
 
273. Even immigrants with legal status might be deterred, as it is not uncommon for ICE to detain 
immigrants who ultimately turn out to be lawfully present. See, e.g., Galarza v. Szalczyk, 745 
F.3d 634, 637-38 (3d Cir. 2014). 
274. See, e.g., Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) v. United States, 870 F.2d 518, 522 (9th Cir. 1989) (re-
lying on evidence that, as a result of INS surveillance, members from multiple churches have 
withdrawn from “active participation . . . , a bible study group has been canceled for lack of 
participation, clergy time has been diverted from regular pastoral duties, support for the 
churches has declined, and congregants have become reluctant to seek pastoral counseling and 
are less open in prayers and confessions”). 
275. See, e.g., Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) v. United States, 752 F. Supp. 1505, 1516 (D. Ariz. 
1990). 
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spending a few days in a sanctuary would entirely defeat that interest.
276
 None-
theless, given the compelling interest deﬁned above, RFRA would likely not pose 
an absolute bar to enforcement actions at a sanctuary—especially if public safety 
concerns were in play. RFRA would instead serve as a potential replacement (and 
an enforceable one) for the religious elements of the existing sensitive locations 
policy. As for enforcement action at nonsanctuary places of worship with immi-
grant congregations, unless ICE could show that other locations would be im-
practicable, it is unlikely this could pass the least-restrictive-means test. 
iv.  sanctuary within the current landscape of religious 
freedom 
RFRA therefore has the potential to offer legal protections for sanctuary 
churches, individuals in sanctuary, and immigrant congregations. But the nor-
mative question of whether there should be a sanctuary accommodation is a 
larger one, requiring a deeper dive into the values implicated in religious accom-
modation. In this Part, I ﬁrst offer an overview of the promise and perils of 
RFRA. In particular, I focus on reviving an understanding of RFRA as a guaran-
tee of substantive equality in the sphere of religious exercise, offering effects-
based protection to ensure de facto equal treatment for subordinate groups. On 
the other side of the coin, I note some of the principal risks of overly strong reli-
gious protections for governance in general, and for the rights of LGBT individ-
uals and access to reproductive care in particular. In Section IV.B, I argue that 
applying this substantive-equality lens to several of the most contentious unan-
swered questions in RFRA doctrine could thread the needle between these ben-
eﬁts and risks and, in so doing, help restore an equilibrium to accommodation 
protections. Speciﬁcally, I argue that this balance could be restored by applying 
RFRA with a special solicitude to the needs of disadvantaged groups. The pos-
sibility of sanctuary cases can help motivate the move toward this equilibrium, 
as it offers a compelling reason to conservatives for imposing limits on accom-
modation doctrine, while also providing progressives with reason to support 
these limited protections instead of retreating from the project of accommoda-
tion entirely. 
 
276. Cf. Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneﬁcente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 437 (2006) 
(treating with skepticism the government’s argument that an “exception could not be made 
even for ‘rigorously policed’ use of ‘one drop’ of [the hallucinogenic tea at issue in the case] 
‘once a year’” (quoting Transcript of Oral Argument at 17)).  
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A. The Promise and Peril of Religious Accommodations 
1. RFRA as Civil Rights Law: Promoting Equality at the Intersection of 
Systemic Disadvantage and Religious Exercise 
A core purpose of RFRA was to ensure that systemically disadvantaged 
groups would not face de facto inequality in the treatment of their religious ex-
ercise. The statute’s legislative history and debates around its enactment are re-
plete with warnings that Smith had established a regime under which inﬂuential, 
mainstream faiths would receive accommodations, while disadvantaged groups 
would not. To remedy this, RFRA is structured to provide effects-based protec-
tions, a mechanism familiar from other areas of civil rights law as a means to 
more effectively address systemic inequality by eschewing the complex inquiry 
into motives. 
If religious accommodation is left solely to legislatures or agencies, the result 
will tend to be a structural imbalance in favor of mainstream faiths.
277
 Because 
of their political clout, mainstream faiths will either receive explicit accommoda-
tions, or, more often than not, laws burdening their exercise will not be passed 
in the ﬁrst place. On the other hand, where a law of general applicability burdens 
the free exercise of systemically underrepresented groups, such as minority faiths 
or prisoners, they will instead face either legislative indifference or outright hos-
tility. Even absent any outright prejudice, these imbalances in political represen-
tation produce a de facto favoritism for mainstream faiths. The resulting legal 
inequality has both practical and expressive effects, as disadvantaged groups will 
face greater burdens on core elements of their identities and lives, which in turn 




To remedy this, RFRA takes an effects-based approach, limiting the extent 
to which government action can have a disparate impact on religious persons—
instead of asking about discriminatory motive or purpose. This represents a spe-
ciﬁc view of how to address disparate treatment, one that tracks larger debates 
in antidiscrimination theory. On one view, discrimination is when improper bias 
 
277. See infra notes 297-304 and accompanying text. 
278. There is reason to think that such expressive effects are particularly problematic in the sphere 
of religion, as the Court has at times recognized in the Establishment Clause context. See Santa 
Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 309-10 (2000) (noting that endorsement communi-
cates to “nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political community, 
and an accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the 
political community”(quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring))). 
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leads to individuals being treated differently based on their group status. Effects-
based protections, however, take aim at deeper, structural inequality. This takes 
different forms in different contexts. It may target employment policies that 
cause a sufficiently disparate statistical result between races.
279
 Or it may mean 
requiring accommodations for individuals with disabilities,
280
 reﬂecting a recog-
nition that society is otherwise typically structured to accommodate the needs of 
those without them. Religious accommodation protections are not exactly iden-
tical to either, though they are perhaps closer to the latter, insofar as they are a 
recognition that laws will tend to be implicitly structured around the main-
stream. But at a general level across contexts, the goal of effects-based protec-
tions extends beyond just preventing improper considerations (explicit or un-
conscious) from prejudicing decision-making, to preventing accumulated or 
structural disadvantage from entrenching de facto favoritism of certain groups 
over others.
281
 So while Scalia was undoubtedly right that, in our pluralistic so-
ciety, different faith groups will unavoidably enjoy different levels of political 
clout,
282
 RFRA would ensure that these inevitable differences would not lead to 
unequal distributions of legal burdens or tacit governmental approval of unequal 
status. And given the number and diversity of faiths in our country, and thus the 
difficulty of foreseeing all possible conﬂicts between faith and law, RFRA pro-
vided for case-by-case determinations as each particular burden arose. 
The text of RFRA applies to religion generally. This is similar to the general 
framing of other civil rights laws. As is the case with seminal civil rights statutes, 
legislative remedies for systemic inequality are often written in language that 
applies broadly to “race” or “sex.”
283
 Yet as with other such laws,
284
 a focus on 
ensuring de facto equal protection for the rights of systemically disadvantaged 
groups was a crucial element in RFRA’s history and structure. While RFRA’s 
enactment of a single standard of review was intended to ensure equal treatment 
across all faiths, not all faiths were equally in need of such protection; to the 
 
279. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (allowing for challenges to facially neutral 
employment practices that had a disparate racial impact). 
280. See Americans with Disabilities Act tits. I, II, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112(b)(5), 12132 (2018). 
281. See Reva B. Siegel, Race-Conscious but Race-Neutral: The Constitutionality of Disparate Impact 
in the Roberts Court, 66 ALA. L. REV. 653, 657-58 (2015) (describing disparate impact protec-
tions in the context of race as addressing intentional, unconscious, and structural discrimina-
tion). 
282. See Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990). 
283. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964 tit. VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2018). 
284. For an interpretation of Title VII in which disparate impact is a means to remedy systemic 
disadvantage, see generally Griggs, 401 U.S. 424. 
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contrary, RFRA would have the effect of undoing de facto favoritism for main-
stream faiths.
285
 In addition to protecting minority faiths, effects-based protec-
tions would serve as correctives in a wider set of contexts where systemic disad-
vantage intersects with religious exercise, such as prisons. 
Applying this effects-based test to remedy systemic underrepresentation 
serves to promote substantive equality in religious exercise. Yet while this means 
providing disadvantaged groups with the same level of protection as mainstream 
faiths, it does not necessarily entail preventing representative government from 
adjusting the extent to which mainstream faiths inﬂuence and shape society—
particularly if this inﬂuence comes at the expense of disempowered groups. In-
deed, RFRA was designed to limit the relative overinﬂuence of mainstream 
faiths. There are several ways in which this principle may be articulated.
286
 
Without rejecting the validity of other formulations, I ﬁnd it useful here to draw 
on literature that employs the lens of “antisubordination.”
287
 As RFRA itself ap-
plies beyond just subordinate groups, I will employ the term “substantive equal-
ity” when describing the law’s purposes more generally and “antisubordination” 
when focusing on the speciﬁc concerns about such populations. Under an anti-
subordination theory, the goal is to create a “community of equals” by prevent-
ing the government from “engaging in a practice that aggravates, perpetuates, 
or merely carries over a disadvantage” of a structurally disadvantaged group.
288
 
This accurately captures the de facto concrete and status harms subordinate 
groups faced under Smith. 
 
285. See infra note 301 and accompanying text; see also Jed Rubenfeld, Antidisestablishmentarianism: 
Why RFRA Really Was Unconstitutional, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2347, 2350 (1997) (“[RFRA] re-
quired states to abolish the favoritism of majority religious practices that their laws of general 
applicability inevitably effect.”). 
286. See Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 113, at 1251, 1283 (articulating a theory of “equal regard” that 
is attentive to “the special vulnerability of minority religious beliefs to hostility or indiffer-
ence”); see also CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER & LAWRENCE G. SAGER, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND 
THE CONSTITUTION 4-6, 13, 52-53, 279-80 (2007) [hereinafter EISGRUBER & SAGER, RELIGIOUS 
FREEDOM] (articulating these concerns as balanced in the concept of “Equal Liberty” and ap-
plying this to the question of accommodations). 
287. See generally Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107 
(1976) (articulating a vision of the Equal Protection Clause grounded in what Fiss calls “the 
group-disadvantaging principle”); Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anti-
classiﬁcation Values in Constitutional Struggles over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470 (2004) (re-
visiting the early debates over Brown to shed light on the overlapping and distinct values of 
anticlassiﬁcation and antisubordination underlying the Equal Protection Clause). 
288. Owen M. Fiss, The Accumulation of Disadvantages, 106 CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) 
(manuscript at 4). Similar concepts have been articulated as “anticaste.” See generally Cass R. 
Sunstein, The Anticaste Principle, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2410 (1994) (detailing the “anticaste prin-
ciple” and explaining its roots in liberty and equality values). 
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This antisubordination justiﬁcation for RFRA permeated congressional 
hearings, the legislative record, and contemporary academic commentary. Dur-
ing the congressional hearings, testimony repeatedly stressed the importance of 
RFRA to protect minorities from the overrepresentation of mainstream faiths in 
the political process.
289
 Minorities were invoked in the hearings as often as con-
science itself.
290
 The Senate committee report stated that state and local legisla-
tures “cannot be relied upon to craft exceptions from laws of general application 
to protect the ability of the religious minorities to practice their faiths.”
291
 It did 
 
289. This was not, of course, the only justiﬁcation given. I discuss some other justiﬁcations infra 
notes 316-323 and accompanying text. Yet these antisubordination-style arguments were re-
peatedly and powerfully invoked as the moral and legal justiﬁcation for RFRA. See The Reli-
gious Freedom Restoration Act: Hearing on S. 2969 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d 
Cong. 31-32 (1992) [hereinafter Senate Committee Hearings] (statement of Elder Dallin H. 
Oaks) (“The worshippers who need [constitutional] protections are the oppressed minorities, 
not the inﬂuential constituent elements of the majority.”); id. at 145 (statement of Forest 
Montgomery, Counsel, National Association of Evangelicals) (warning that the government 
is “now free to impose laws without any regard for the religious sensibilities of minorities”); 
id. at 171-72 (statement of Nadine Strossen, President, American Civil Liberties Union) 
(“[T]he Supreme Court showed such a callous view toward the religious rights, and, by anal-
ogy, other constitutional rights of the disempowered, the unpopular, the minority religious 
and racial groups, turning on its head our understanding that the primary purpose of the free 
exercise clause and other provisions of the Bill of Rights was precisely to protect those disem-
powered minorities.”); id. at 5-29 (describing stories of Hmong immigrants); id. at 30-40 
(describing persecution of Mormons); id. at 50-58 (providing an appendix of post-Smith 
cases, many of which involve either minority faiths, subordinate persons such as prisoners or 
immigrants, or very speciﬁc instances where the political process appears systematically to 
break down, such as land use); id. at 135-47 (statement of Forest Montgomery). The House 
Subcommittee hearings are partly duplicative, so I will only cite variations here. See 1992 House 
Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 126, at 54 (question by Rep. Craig Washington); id. at 104 
(testimony of Nadine Strossen) (describing a history in which Catholics got legislative ex-
emptions for wine but not Native Americans for peyote as “a matter of the mainstream, the 
powerful versus the minority and the oppressed”); id. at 118 (statement of original sponsor 
Rep. Stephen Solarz) (criticizing Justice Scalia’s position that “accommodating the religious 
preferences of minorities is a luxury which we cannot afford”); id. at 157 (statement of Edward 
Gaffney, Dean and Professor of Law, Valparaiso University School of Law) (“Sending unpop-
ular religious minorities to city councils and State legislatures for relief is like sending the 
Jehovah’s Witnesses to the very legislative bodies in the 1930s that were doing their level best 
to get rid of them.”). 
290. Across the three legislative hearings, “minority/ies” is used in a relevant way 145 times, and 
“conscience/s” is used 147 times. See Senate Committee Hearings, supra note 289; 1992 House 
Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 126; Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1990: Hearing on 
H.R. 5377 Before the Subcomm. on Civil & Constitutional Rights of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
101st Cong. (1990). 
291. S. REP. NO. 103-111, at 8 (1993). 
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not employ the term “conscience.”
292
 The House committee report quoted Bar-
nette in stating that the “very purpose of a Bill of Rights” is to place certain issues 
“beyond the reach of majorities and officials” and excoriated Justice Scalia’s com-
fort with the fact that Smith would disproportionately disadvantage minority 
faiths.
293
 And indeed, the test that RFRA sought to restore had emerged to pro-
vide equal protection to subordinate groups.
294
 When interpreting legislation, it 
is instructive to ask what harm the law in question was intended to solve. Here, 
the harm was that the line of cases culminating in Smith was leaving Native 
Americans, Jews, and Muslims without judicial recourse.
295
 Indeed, the two 
cases cited most frequently in public and legal justiﬁcations of why RFRA was 
urgently needed involved Orthodox Jewish and Hmong families whose loved 
ones were subjected to routine autopsies that deeply violated their faiths.
296
 
Academic commentators from across the board echoed the argument that 
Smith left minorities at the mercy of a political process in which they were sys-
temically underrepresented.
297
 As Michael McConnell, who for decades has been 
one of the most inﬂuential conservative voices in favor of religious accommoda-
tions, explained the argument for exemptions in 1990: “Judicially enforceable 
exemptions under the free exercise clause are therefore needed to ensure that 
unpopular or unfamiliar faiths will receive the same consideration afforded 





293. H.R. REP. NO. 103-88, at 4, 6 (1993). The term “conscience” only appeared in a quotation 
from Smith.  
294. See supra note 96 and accompanying text; see also Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revi-
sionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109, 1132 (1990) (“Prior to Smith, the Free 
Exercise Clause functioned . . . to extend to minority religions the same degree of solicitude 
that more mainstream religions are able to attain through the political process. The Free Ex-
ercise Clause, prior to Smith, was an equalizer.”). 
295. See supra Section II.A. 
296. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 530-32 (1997); S. REP. NO. 103-111, at 8 n.13; Elliot 
M. Mincberg, A Progressive Organization’s Look at RFRA, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 801, 803-04 
(1999). 
297. See, e.g., Thomas C. Berg, What Hath Congress Wrought? An Interpretive Guide to the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act, 39 VILL. L. REV. 1, 21 (1994) (“A prime goal of granting judicially 
recognized exceptions from general legislation is to ensure that minority religious practices 
receive the same consideration in the courts that majority practices already receive in the po-
litical process.”); Laycock, supra note 128, at 899-901; Mincberg, supra note 296, at 803-04. 
298. Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 
103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1419-20 (1990). 
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This outlined a vision in which equality required de facto equal treatment be-
tween minorities and inﬂuential mainstream faiths.
299
 Stephen Carter, who had 
advised President Clinton on religious issues,
300
 argued that stronger accommo-
dation protections were acutely needed to restore the balance between religious 
persons who had legislative clout and those who did not.
301
 Referring to Wash-
ington v. Davis,
302
 Carter wrote that Smith had placed “members of nontradi-
tional religions in the same bizarre predicament as people of color, whose 
chances of proving equal protection violations have been severely circumscribed 
by a series of decisions insisting on direct proof of a motive to discriminate when 
the challenged law does not draw racial distinctions on its face.”
303
 The coalition 
of progressive groups behind RFRA, vital to the law’s passage and bipartisan 




Perhaps most telling was that it was not only the advocates of RFRA’s frame-
work but also some of the law’s strongest judicial critics whose treatment of the 
statute reﬂected their views on effects-based protections. The decisions striking 
down the Sherbert test in Smith, and then partially invalidating RFRA in Boerne, 
reﬂected a broader rejection of effects-based protections.
305
 The Court would 
subsequently cite Boerne itself to partly invalidate the Americans with Disabilities 




299. See Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 15 (“Constitution-
ally adjudicated exemptions for small or unpopular religious minorities merely match the leg-
islative exemptions commonly granted to larger or more accepted faiths.”); McConnell, supra 
note 294, at 1147 (“To achieve equal rights of conscience, the courts should frame the free 
exercise inquiry as follows: Is the governmental interest so important that the government 
would impose a burden of this magnitude on the majority in order to achieve it?”). 
300. See David Owen, From Race to Chase, NEW YORKER (June 3, 2002), https://www.newyorker
.com/magazine/2002/06/03/from-race-to-chase [https://perma.cc/Q4AL-JM9W]. 
301. See Stephen L. Carter, The Resurrection of Religious Freedom?, 107 HARV. L. REV. 118, 139-40 
(1993) (arguing that “it is the domination of our politics by the mainline faiths, which the 
state never threatens, that makes the need for accommodation so acute,” and that courts 
should be “far more” skeptical of actions that interfere with religious practice when those re-
ligions are “outside the mainstream”). 
302. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).  
303. Id. at 128. For McConnell, the analogy was rather to individuals with disabilities. McConnell, 
supra note 294, at 1140. 
304. See, e.g., Senate Committee Hearings, supra note 289, at 171-73 (testimony of Nadine Strossen); 
Mincberg, supra note 296, at 803-04. 
305. See supra notes 115-118, 138-143 and accompanying text. 
306. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 357-58, 370-74 (2001) (discussing City 
of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 530-31, 536 (1997)). 
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True to their purpose, effects-based accommodation protections have indeed 
helped to ensure a more equal society in the sphere of religious exercise—and 
done so with bipartisan support. Recent RFRA and RLUIPA claims by a small 
indigenous sect from the Amazon,
307
 by a group of prisoners of “‘nonmain-
stream’ religions: the Satanist, Wicca, and Asatru religions, and the Church of 
Jesus Christ Christian,”
308
 and by a Muslim prisoner,
309
 have won unanimous 
victories at the Supreme Court. Even those who have advocated forcefully for 
accommodation for mainstream faiths will often foreground protecting minori-
ties as a justiﬁcation for religious accommodation.
310
 Consider RLUIPA. While 
the statute provides protection to prisoners, it was signed by the same President 
and passed by an ideologically similar Congress to the one that, just four years 
earlier, had dramatically limited court access and habeas rights with the Prison 
Litigation Reform Act
311
  and the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty 
Act.
312
 Beyond that, the 1990s were a period in which tough-on-crime rhetoric 
produced bipartisan laws increasing sentences and contributing to rising mass 
incarceration. In this climate, it is nothing short of remarkable that a unanimous 
Congress passed a law focused explicitly on the free exercise rights of incarcer-
ated persons. As Andrew Koppelman put it: “RLUIPA generates the only pris-
oner claims that are treated with any respect by the courts. Absent a discourse of 
religious liberty, it is hard to see how one could smuggle into American law the 
notion that convicts are human beings with rights.”
313
 And since its enactment, 




Other interpretations of RFRA have been offered, though none offer a satis-
factory account of the statute without reference to the concerns about subordi-
nate groups outlined above. These include theories based around concepts of (1) 
 
307. Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneﬁcente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006). 
308. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 712 (2005). 
309. Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853 (2015). 
310. See, e.g., Dylan Mathews, Why a Pro-Same-Sex-Marriage Law Professor Supports Indiana’s Re-
ligious Freedom Law, VOX (Mar. 31, 2015, 12:00 PM), https://www.vox.com/2015/3/31
/8319415/indiana-religious-freedom-discrimination [https://perma.cc/P8N4-XU6Q] (de-
scribing religious accommodation cases as primarily about nonmainstream, minority group 
religions). 
311. Pub. L. No. 104-134, §§ 801-810, 110 Stat. 1321, 1321-66 to 1321-77 (1996). 
312. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996). 
313. Andrew Koppelman, Kent Greenawalt, Defender of the Faith, 95 TEX. L. REV. 821, 829 (2017) 
(book review) (footnote omitted). 
314. See Derek L. Gaubatz, RLUIPA at Four: Evaluating the Success and Constitutionality of RLUIPA’s 
Prisoner Provisions, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 501, 566-68 (2005). 
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liberty of individual conscience and (2) neutrality, though there is at times sig-
niﬁcant overlap between the two. 
On an individual conscience account, the statute serves to protect a substan-
tive liberty right, without reference to the treatment of others. There would be 
no special harms in minority faiths or subordinate groups being burdened. 
Therefore, courts would not need to take any particular concerns into consider-
ation when evaluating the claims from such groups. This view of religious free-
dom as fundamentally a matter of individual conscience is relatively prevalent.
315
 
However, the idea that RFRA was solely about individual liberty—without refer-
ence to structural imbalances or disfavored groups—is not as apt a ﬁt for the 
statute’s history, the problem the statute sought to address, and the effects-based 
protections it established. 
To be sure, legislative history rarely speaks with one voice, and RFRA was 
no exception. Even in the early 1990s, some of RFRA’s supporters argued that 
mainstream faiths needed just as much protection as minorities.
316
 This argu-
ment was not as prevalent in testimony, but it was present and when offered, 
was forcefully made.
317
 Yet even among those who affirmatively argued that 
mainstream faiths required protection, the explanation for why RFRA was con-
stitutional under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment emphasized the his-
tory of religious persecution of minorities.
318
 This was understandable, as Sec-
 
315. See, e.g., ROBERT P. GEORGE, CONSCIENCE AND ITS ENEMIES: CONFRONTING THE DOGMAS OF 
LIBERAL SECULARISM, at ix-xii, 110-113 (2013). 
316. See William P. Marshall, Extricating the Religious Exemption Debate from the Culture Wars, 41 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 67, 72-73 (2018). 
317. See, e.g., Senate Committee Hearings, supra note 289, at 42-43 (statement of Oliver S. Thomas, 
General Counsel, Baptist Joint Committee on Public Affairs); id. at 63-77 (statement of Doug-
las Laycock, Professor, University of Texas School of Law). 
318. See id. at 95-96 (statement of Douglas Laycock) (“Religious minorities are no safer than racial 
minorities if their rights depend on persuading a federal judge to condemn the government’s 
motives.”); id. at 96, 129 (testimony of Douglas Laycock) (analogizing RFRA to the Voting 
Rights Act and stating that in order for the statute to be a constitutional exercise of Section 5 
power, Congress should make ﬁndings that (1) generally applicable laws have been used as 
instruments of religious persecution; (2) members of Congress are experts on the political 
process; and (3) adjudicating the motive of government actors case-by-case “is not a workable 
means of protecting religious liberty”). The idea that RFRA was analogous to other statutory 
disparate impact protections also played a crucial role in the law’s defense in Boerne. See Brief 
of Respondent Flores, City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (No. 95-2074), 1997 WL 
10293 (relying heavily on an analogy to disparate impact protections in defending RFRA); 
Brief for the United States, Boerne, 521 U.S. 507 (No. 95-2074), 1997 WL 13201, at *24-27, *29-
32 (“Because minority religions often lack the political power to obtain accommodations, Con-
gress concluded that legislation was needed to preserve for them the same religious freedom 
enjoyed by more established faiths.”). 
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tion 5 would require proportionality,
319
 and effects-based protections would be 
an odd ﬁt for groups that wielded signiﬁcant political clout. Some have charac-
terized progressives as being deceived by RFRA, tricked into supporting the law 
by legislative advocates who pitched it as protective of minorities and disadvan-
taged groups.
320
 Yet as an empirical matter, many commentators were likely cor-
rect that, at the time of its passage, mainstream faiths would rarely, if ever, need 
a second line of defense in the courts.
321
 This helps explain the initially luke-
warm support for RFRA among certain mainstream faith groups, who saw little 
to gain and signed on only after they were reassured that they had little to lose.
322
 
For these groups, remedying Smith was not pressing; their opposition delayed 
passage of the law for three years.
323
 Even beyond that, while there was a theo-
retical gulf, in 1993 it was still possible for these different approaches to be po-
litically consistent. Because mainstream faiths would so rarely be burdened, it 
was reasonable to believe, as so many did, that RFRA could be justiﬁed inde-
pendently and primarily as about protecting disadvantaged groups. Inversely, it 
is implausible to imagine that RFRA could have been passed in the way that it 
was absent the widespread sense that minority rights were being consistently 
underprotected. 
There are also profound incongruities between an individual-conscience ac-
count of what RFRA protects and how it protects it. While a full accounting of 
the problems with an explanation of RFRA as solely focused on individual con-
science is beyond the scope of this Note, I will touch on a few of the most signif-
icant. First, existing protections are problematically underinclusive. Whether re-
ligion should be treated as “special” compared to secular conscience has 
provoked considerable debate.
324
 While the question of religion as a broad soci-
 
319. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520. 
320. See, e.g., Marci A. Hamilton, The Case for Evidence-Based Free Exercise Accommodation: Why the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act Is Bad Public Policy, 9 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 129, 155 (2015). 
321. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion: An Update and a Response to the 
Critics, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 685, 721, 734 (1992) (“Of course, truly mainstream religions 
have little need for accommodations at all. Given their inﬂuence on the culture, it is unlikely 
that the laws will conﬂict in any serious way with their deeply held principles.”). 
322. See supra notes 126-130 and accompanying text. 
323. See supra notes 126-130 and accompanying text. 
324. See, e.g., BRIAN LEITER, WHY TOLERATE RELIGION? (2012); Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 113, 
at 1315; Andrew Koppelman, Is It Fair to Give Religion Special Treatment?, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 
571; Michael W. McConnell, The Problem of Singling Out Religion, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 1 (2000); 
Micah Schwartzman, What If Religion Is Not Special?, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 1351, 1352 (2012); 
Nelson Tebbe, Nonbelievers, 97 VA. L. REV. 1111, 1131 (2011). 
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ological phenomenon may be more complex, from the perspective of individual con-
science alone, there is simply no principled reason to protect against only laws that 
compel individuals to act contrary to their deeply held religious beliefs, while 
leaving other deeply held moral beliefs unprotected.
325
 There is a clear problem 
on an individual conscience account when a religious prisoner’s vegetarian diet 
is protected by strict scrutiny, while burdens on the diet of a lifelong ethical veg-
etarian are subject to highly deferential court review. Yet some courts persist in 
extending RFRA’s protections only to belief systems that have the “accoutre-
ments” of traditional religion.
326
 While other courts have adopted deﬁnitions of 
“religion” as “moral, ethical, or religious beliefs about what is right and wrong” 
that are “held with the strength of traditional religious convictions,”
327
 this raises 
its own problems. As interpreted in Hobby Lobby, RFRA protects all religious 
exercise—even when not central to a religion or compelled by it.
328
 This covers 
conduct that goes well beyond matters of deepest conscience. Expanding protec-
tions to conduct that was neither compelled nor central to all conscience would 
not only raise thorny deﬁnitional questions—such as what exactly constitutes 
noncentral moral conscience—but would also extend protections well beyond 
manageability if not tempered by a limiting principle like special solicitude for 
disadvantaged groups. 
Second, the protection of individual conscience alone is a poor ﬁt for RFRA’s 
effects-based approach. There are genuine concerns about the policy impact of 
allowing such a wide swath of laws to be subjected to strict scrutiny solely based 
on effects.
329
 As was appreciated long ago,
330
 legislative policy compromises will 
 
325. A few courts have also recently found in other contexts that differentiating between similarly 
situated religious and secular conscience would be unconstitutional. See, e.g., Ctr. for Inquiry, 
Inc. v. Marion Circuit Court Clerk, 758 F.3d 869 (7th Cir. 2014) (ﬁnding both a First Amend-
ment and an equal protection violation); March for Life v. Burwell, 128 F. Supp. 3d 116, 127-
28 (D.D.C. 2015) (ﬁnding an equal protection violation). And some proponents of religious 
accommodation protections appear to accept the idea that such protections could extend to 
conscience more generally. See Mark L. Rienzi, The Case for Religious Exemptions—Whether 
Religion Is Special or Not, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1395, 1408-13 (2014) (book review). 
326. See United States v. Meyers, 95 F.3d 1475, 1483 (10th Cir. 1996); see also Africa v. Pennsylvania, 
662 F.2d 1025, 1031-36 (3d Cir. 1981). 
327. United States v. Ward, 989 F.2d 1015, 1018 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting Welsh v. United States, 
398 U.S. 333, 340 (1970)); see also Patrick v. LeFevre, 745 F.2d 153, 157 (2d Cir. 1984); Callahan 
v. Woods, 658 F.2d 679, 683 (9th Cir. 1981). These courts draw this deﬁnition from landmark 
Supreme Court conscientious objection cases. See generally United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 
163 (1965); Welsh, 398 U.S. 333. 
328. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2762 (2014). 
329. See supra Section III.A.2. 
330. See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938). 
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not always stand up to this degree of scrutiny. While effects-based protections 
may be necessary in the case of minorities or groups systemically disadvantaged 
in the political process,
331
 it is difficult to explain why it would plausibly extend 
to all religious conscience in all contexts. In the Title VII employment context, 
for example, an employer may deny a religious accommodation upon a showing 
of undue hardship, a much lower standard.
332
 Indeed, in other areas of law, in-
direct burdens on expressive conduct receive considerably less than strict scru-
tiny.
333
 And to the extent the individual conscience account would allow RFRA 
to remain a means for inﬂuential mainstream faiths to get a second chance at 
protecting traditional hierarchies in the courts after losing in the legislatures, it 





331. Id. at 152 n.4. 
332. Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 67 (1986) (“[A]n accommodation causes 
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employer.” (quoting Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84 (1977))). 
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sive conduct, see 391 U.S. 367 (1968), but the Court has interpreted it to be far less searching 
than strict scrutiny, see City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 289, 296-302 (2000) (referring 
to O’Brien as “less stringent” than strict scrutiny, applying it deferentially as to the facts found 
by the legislature, and making clear that it is not a “least restrictive means” analysis). 
334. See infra text accompanying note 349. Another justiﬁcation sometimes given for laws like 
RFRA is that accommodations are necessary in order to preserve a space for religion, speciﬁ-
cally religious communities in civil society or the public sphere. See, e.g., Sherif Girgis, Nervous 
Victors, Illiberal Measures: A Response to Douglas NeJaime and Reva Siegel, 125 YALE L.J.F. 399, 
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expression”). Yet this theory is hard put to explain the magnitude and scope of RFRA’s pro-
tections. This argument operates primarily in a register of jurisdictional or associational con-
cerns. See Richard W. Garnett, Standing, Spending, and Separation: How the No-Establishment 
Rule Does (and Does Not) Protect Conscience, 54 VILL. L. REV. 655, 674 (2009); Paul Hor-
witz, Churches as First Amendment Institutions: Of Sovereignty and Spheres, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. 
L. REV. 79, 116-22 (2009); see also Douglas Laycock, Towards a General Theory of the Religion 
Clauses: The Case of Church Labor Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1373, 1389 (1981) (differentiating between church autonomy arguments and “the right 
of conscientious objection to government policy”). Yet other associational rights, such as 
those of political parties or unions, are not protected by an effects-based strict scrutiny test 
every time any member of the group ﬁnds that conduct related to their membership is indi-
rectly burdened by government regulation out in the world. Or take units of our country that 
are formally quasi-autonomous or sovereign, such as the states and tribes. These provide 
many of the beneﬁts attributed to religious groups as safeguards of pluralism and sites of 
identity- and law-creation. See, e.g., Robert M. Cover, The Uses of Jurisdictional Redundancy: 
Interest, Ideology, and Innovation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 639, 641-43 (1981); Judith Resnik, 
Accommodations, Discounts, and Displacement: The Variability of Rights as a Norm of Federal-
ism(s), 17 JUS POLITICUM 209, 213 (2017). Yet neither states nor tribes are protected by effects-
based strict scrutiny when federal government action displaces their sphere of activity—such 
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This does not mean that conscience has no role in RFRA—it does. Indeed, 
equality in this context will often mean ensuring equal respect for conscience 
across groups, analogous perhaps to the role of employment in laws protecting 
against discrimination in employment. In that sense, it serves to provide the con-
tent onto which a lens of substantive equality is overlaid. 
Beyond individual conscience, other equality-style explanations for RFRA’s 
effects-based protections have been given, often framed in the language of neu-
trality.
335
 Take, for example, Douglas Laycock’s theory of substantive neutrality, 
under which “[g]overnment should not interfere with our beliefs about religion 
either by coercion or by persuasion.”
336
 Yet as Laycock recognizes, accommoda-
tions can encourage religion if they provide an exemption that would otherwise 
be desirable for nonreligious reasons.
337
 There are a number of possible situa-
tions where this might arise under RFRA’s protections: military service exemp-
tions,
338
 access to mind-altering substances,
339
 exemptions to employers from 
providing certain kinds of insurance,
340
 or beneﬁts for religious prisoners.
341
 




as when, for example, a federal law might burden an individual’s ability to participate in the 
social and political culture of a state. Instead, preemption analysis allows displacement when 
state or tribal law is an obstacle to federal purposes. It is implausible that religious communi-
ties would somehow be entitled to greater protections than such formally sovereign units. As 
such, this account can explain constitutional decisions limiting speciﬁc interference with the 
religious right to association, such as Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. 
EEOC, 565 U.S. 171 (2012), but not RFRA’s broad protections. 
335. See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality Toward Religion, 
39 DEPAUL L. REV. 993 (1990). For an account of how accommodation and neutrality interact, 
see generally ANDREW KOPPELMAN, DEFENDING AMERICAN RELIGIOUS NEUTRALITY (2013). 
336. Laycock, supra note 335, at 1002. 
337. Id. at 1017-18; Laycock, supra note 299, at 17. 
338. Laycock, supra note 335, at 1018. 
339. Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneﬁcente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006). 
340. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
341. Note, In the Belly of the Whale: Religious Practice in Prison, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1891, 1899 n.43 
(2002). 
342. See Laycock, supra note 335, at 1017-18. Furthermore, if indirect, incidental burdens are suffi-
cient to constitute nonneutral coercion, would not incidental beneﬁts constitute nonneutral 
persuasion? Even slight incentives can have outsized effects on conduct. Under a neutral-im-
pact rule, any government support to religion could constitute incidental persuasion. Not only 
would such a reading imperil a whole swath of government programs, but RFRA expressly 
maintains that “[g]ranting government funding, beneﬁts, or exemptions, to the extent per-
missible under the Establishment Clause, shall not constitute a violation of this chapter.” 42 
U.S.C. § 2000bb-4 (2018); see also EISGRUBER & SAGER, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, supra note 286, 
at 28 (noting that “government inevitably, and quite desirably, inﬂuences choices about reli-
gion”). 
the yale law journal 128:408  2018 
466 
More generally, these accounts often fail to offer compelling answers as to neu-
trality of what. RFRA could not have been about ensuring neutrality between 
religious persons and nonreligious persons with conscientious objections to 
laws, since neither enjoyed more than the other under Smith. The idea that neu-
trality requires that there be a total neutral impact between speciﬁcally religious 
persons compared to those who do not feel strongly about a law problematically 
erases secular conscience. 
The importance of substantive equality and concern for subordinate groups 
to RFRA’s passage is evidenced by its statutory structure, legislative history, and 
position in the broader history of protections for religious exercise. Not only 
does adopting this lens offer a compelling explanation for this statute, it also 
holds out the promise of defusing current partisan fractiousness around accom-
modation claims by returning to the shared consensus that animated the law’s 
1993 passage. Although extending effects-based protections for subordinate 
groups was not the sole justiﬁcation for RFRA among its supporters, it unques-
tionably constituted a core purpose of the statute in light of which lacunae or 
ambiguities can and should be interpreted.
343
 And even if one thought the stat-
ute was primarily about individual conscience, for the reasons I give in the fol-
lowing Sections, there are still strong prudential reasons for concluding that 
subordinate status provides valuable context at various stages of the RFRA anal-
ysis. 
2. The Risks of Overaccommodation 
No protection of rights comes without important trade-offs, and religious 
accommodation is no exception. Decisions such as Hobby Lobby, as well as litiga-
tion brought by conservative advocacy groups, offer a troubling vision of a po-
tential future for religious accommodations. These developments carry two 
principal risks: ﬁrst, that accommodation claims will be used to undermine reg-
ulatory efforts across the board, making effective governance unduly burden-
some, and second, that religious accommodations will be employed to system-
atically undermine antidiscrimination protections for LGBT individuals and 
reduce access to reproductive care. 
As to the ﬁrst, echoing Scalia’s warning in Smith of “anarchy,” some com-
mentators have noted the dangers that strong accommodation protections pose 
to effective governance.
344
 This country is home to a great diversity of religious 
 
343. See infra Section IV.B.1. 
344. See, e.g., LEITER, supra note 324, at 94-107. 
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belief. Religious faiths frequently attach signiﬁcance to any number of oft-regu-
lated areas—food and its production, public and private spaces, health care, and 
so forth. Strengthening accommodation protections, the argument goes, will 
produce continual obstacles to effective governance, as any attempt at regulation 
risks conﬂicting with some idiosyncratic faith somewhere.
345
 
Yet while small, idiosyncratic faiths are most likely to present accommoda-
tion claims that government actors could not have envisioned, accommodating 
them is also less likely to impede governance generally. RFRA, after all, does not 
strike down statutes on their face, but rather grants targeted, often individual-
ized exceptions. When the number of adherents is small, regulation is not im-
peded in any meaningful sense, and the entire process may indeed run somewhat 
more smoothly by avoiding unnecessary conﬂict. Furthermore, as I discuss 
above, protecting small or unpopular faiths is perhaps the strongest justiﬁcation 
for robust, effects-based accommodation protections. 
The real risk posed by accommodation to effective governance comes rather 
from large faith communities that either directly control important institutions 
in society, such as hospitals, or whose members make up such a signiﬁcant pro-
portion of society that their ability to opt out of regulatory projects would have 
a meaningful effect on the scope of those projects. For example, as Reva Siegel 
and Douglas NeJaime note, a signiﬁcant proportion of patients—perhaps more 
than one in six—receive care at religious hospitals that may have grounds for a 
variety of religiously motivated healthcare refusals.
346
 These numbers may well 
be considerably higher in various areas of the country.
347
 In this context, accom-
modations may create entire jurisdictions in which generally applicable federal 
laws no longer apply. 
Nowhere is this risk more salient today than in the areas of LGBT rights and 
access to reproductive care. In such instances, politically inﬂuential mainstream 
faith groups have attempted, at times successfully, to employ the accommoda-
tion doctrine to limit the scope of rights expansions with which they disagree.
348
 
Even if one does not agree that the resulting outcomes or the partisan polariza-
tion they have produced are problematic in themselves—though there is strong 
reason to believe that they are—such cases are also hard to square with the struc-
ture of RFRA’s effects-based protections. Effects-based protections serve as a 
second line of defense for groups systemically underrepresented in the political 
 
345. See Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 888 (1990); Marc O. DeGirolami, Religious Accommo-
dation, Religious Tradition, and Political Polarization, 20 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1127, 1131-32 
(2017) (critiquing the view that “[a]ccommodation is for the exotic, the peculiar, and (espe-
cially) the unthreatening”). 
346. NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 162, at 2556-58. 
347. Id. at 2557 (pointing to the example of Washington State). 
348. See supra notes 159-161 and accompanying text. 
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process. When extended to well-represented mainstream faiths, they instead of-
fer a second bite at the apple whenever those groups do not happen to win leg-
islatively. Of course, laws passed with prejudicial purposes toward any faith, 
mainstream or not, are rightly forbidden by the Free Exercise Clause. But this 
does not translate coherently into a guarantee of effects-based protections. The 
result threatens to be a de facto limit on how—and where—the government can 
act to protect LGBT individuals from various forms of accumulated disad-
vantage or even outright prejudice. Applying effects-based protections to politi-
cally powerful, mainstream faiths in a way that perpetuates existing societal hi-
erarchies would be quite anomalous for a statute that was designed as a means 
of ensuring equal protection to the vulnerable in order to achieve a more equal 
society. The result may well be a signiﬁcant obstacle to governance and redistri-
bution in favor of private ordering,
349
 the burdens of which will fall most heavily 
on vulnerable groups. 
B. How Sanctuary Claims Can Help Restore Equilibrium to Religious Freedom 
Doctrine 
For some, the concerns described above may be sufficient to support the 
complete dismantling of RFRA and similar protections. Yet I am not so willing 
to leave behind the bipartisan, minority-protecting spirit that helped produce 
legislation providing such strong protection to unpopular faiths and prisoners. 
The need for it is especially acute. In the United States, the facial neutrality of a 
policy restricting access from primarily Muslim-majority countries was sufficient 
to shield it from more searching review.
350
 In other Western countries, coverings 
(such as burqas) have been banned in certain spaces on the basis of facially neu-
tral security justiﬁcations.
351
 The United States currently incarcerates millions of 
persons whose ability to practice their faiths can be a crucial bulwark against the 
dehumanizing carceral context.
352
 On the border, faith-based groups are being 
 
349. See Elizabeth Sepper, Free Exercise Lochnerism, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1453 (2015) (arguing that 
courts are resurrecting “Lochnerism”—that is, a libertarian skepticism of government inter-
vention—in RFRA jurisprudence). 
350. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2418-23 (2018). 
351. Matthew Weaver, Burqa Bans, Headscarves, and Veils: A Timeline of Legislation in the West, 
GUARDIAN (May 13, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/mar/14/headscarves 
-and-muslim-veil-ban-debate-timeline [https://perma.cc/6ZT8-FWEK]. 
352. Danielle Kaeble & Mary Cowhig, Correctional Populations of the United States, 2016, U.S. DEP’T 
JUST. (Apr. 2018), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpus16.pdf [https://perma.cc
/2BGA-S5CW]. As Justice Brennan eloquently put it in his dissent in Shabazz, “Incarceration 
by its nature denies a prisoner participation in the larger human community. To deny the 
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criminally prosecuted for providing food, water, and shelter to undocumented 
migrants in a desert where hundreds of migrants die each year.
353
 We already 
have a shared vocabulary of religious tolerance and conscience that can protect 
vulnerable individuals, minority faiths, and church communities that minister 
to the needy. Restoring concerns about subordination to religious accommoda-
tion would be an important step toward reclaiming and embracing this valuable 
legacy. 
However, even if one were to disagree with those normative positions, it ap-
pears unlikely that RFRA will be fundamentally weakened by the courts anytime 
soon. RFRA’s protections for subordinate groups may cut crossways on any at-
tempt to build a legislative coalition to repeal the law. Furthermore, constitu-
tional free exercise protections, which implicate a number of the issues addressed 
below, may very well be effectively expanded in upcoming years. As such, even 
progressive critics of the statute or religious accommodation generally have good 
reason to support a realignment of the doctrine to be attentive to substantive 
equality. In this Section, I discuss how sanctuary claims can help move RFRA 
doctrine toward a more stable equilibrium and defuse existing partisan divides. 
And to the extent that there are efforts to read certain elements of RFRA case law 
back into constitutional free exercise protections, the discussion in this Section 
would be relevant to those debates as well. 
I should be careful at the outset to note that the existence of political conﬂict 
in itself does not render decisions like Hobby Lobby problematic—just as subse-
quent “backlash” does not indicate a fundamental defect in landmark civil rights 
or reproductive rights decisions.
354
 Some of our most deeply held values are the 
ones that provoke the most debate. Political conﬂict is an inherent part of a 
healthy democratic system.
355
 Courts are rightly understood as interlocutors 
within these debates, as the history of accommodation law illustrates well. Yet 
one of the deﬁning features of RFRA and RLUIPA was nearly unanimous bipar-
tisan support. This was central to their legitimacy and these statutes’ claim to 
 
opportunity to affirm membership in a spiritual community, however, may extinguish an in-
mate’s last source of hope for dignity and redemption.” O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 
342, 368 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
353. Rafael Carranza, Migrant Aid Group Says Border Patrol Targeted Them with Arrests, ARIZ. RE-
PUBLIC (May 12, 2018), https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/politics/border-issues/2018
/05/12/border-patrol-targeting-aid-workers-scott-warren-no-more-deaths/587940002 
[https://perma.cc/UE8F-TT6Q]. 
354. See Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash, 42 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 373, 374 (2007) (arguing that “interpretive disagreement [i]s a normal con-
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355. See CHANTAL MOUFFE, ON THE POLITICAL 19-21 (2005). 
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speak in a constitutional register, giving meaning to some of our most funda-
mental protections. These laws were built on the idea that we as a society could 
form a consensus around what it meant to protect vulnerable faiths and the per-
sons who adhere to them. In this sense, RFRA could have been a kind of super-
statute, as William Eskridge and John Ferejohn use the term—that is, a law that 
arises out of signiﬁcant public deliberation and seeks to go beyond simple regu-
lation, to instead create and entrench a popular consensus around a fundamental 
norm.
356
 As the original consensus indicated, RFRA had the chance to establish 
such a norm, and something important is being lost as this consensus erodes. 
While the statutory language might remain the same, RFRA is at risk of losing 
its status as the embodiment of bipartisan shared values, an outcome that should 
be concerning to all. 
1. Clarifying Doctrinal Limits 
Sanctuary claims can help render concrete for conservatives the peril of var-
ious expansive accounts of RFRA’s scope. In this Section, I examine several ar-
guments for broadening RFRA’s protections that have been advanced in recent 
litigation and discuss how each relates to a substantive-equality understanding 
of effects-based accommodation, concerns about overaccommodation, and ﬁ-
nally sanctuary claims themselves. I should note at the outset that applying this 
lens would not mean that mainstream faiths would never be protected, as RFRA 
applies to religion generally and establishes a single doctrinal test. Instead, it 
would mean applying the exceptionally concise test laid out by the statute with 
greater attention to the concerns about subordinate groups that helped motivate 
it. Partly due to the brevity of the law, certain live questions, such as the role of 
preexisting exemptions, receive little guidance from the text. Any answer will 
require a theory of accommodation of some kind. This lens simply requires that 
courts ask whether an accommodation would further (or undercut) the effort to 
give equal consideration to the concerns of disadvantaged and powerful groups 
alike. 
a. Substantial Burden 
In the Zubik litigation, religious nonproﬁts challenged the process for opting 
out of providing contraceptive insurance coverage under the Affordable Care 
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CONSTITUTION 12-13 (2010). 




 These nonproﬁts argued that even ﬁlling out a form to opt out, which 
would place the cost of coverage on a third-party insurer or the government, 
rendered them complicit in providing contraceptives.
358
 The nonproﬁts con-
tended that the substantial burden analysis should only ask whether the religious 
claimants consider the burden substantial and whether the failure to obey the 
law would result in substantial penalties.
359
 Yet this would effectively make reli-
gious plaintiffs judges in their own cases. An overwhelming majority of circuit 
courts rejected this argument, holding that the substantial burden analysis re-
quired courts to inquire whether, as a question of law, the burden was objectively 
substantial.
360
 The Supreme Court declined to answer this question, instead re-
manding with an instruction that the parties ﬁnd agreement.
361
 
This question is relevant to sanctuary. A common critique is that churches 
have many options to help the needy but choose to provide sanctuary for political 
reasons; prohibiting sanctuary would not prevent a church from engaging in its 
religious obligations to help others, since plenty of other legal means of charity 
remain available.
362
 These kinds of concerns could be addressed by adopting the 
objective substantial burden inquiry that federals courts of appeals continue to 
use post-Zubik.
363
 Courts can judge whether a religious claimant’s description of 
how the law operates is accurate or whether, on the claimant’s own account of 
her beliefs, the law imposes a legally substantial burden.
364
 When a person asks 
society to reorganize itself around her conduct, she should at the very least be 
willing to explain how much she herself would be willing to forego to engage in 
that conduct. While outsiders may not agree with her faith, the question of how 
much a given legal requirement burdens her ability to practice (and whether that 
satisﬁes an objective burden standard) is as readily comprehensible as other 
 
357. Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557, 1559 (2016). 
358. Id. 
359. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 14, Univ. of Dall. v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 2008 (2015) (mem.)  
(No. 15-834), 2015 WL 9592025; see also Michael A. Helfand, Identifying Substantial Burdens, 
2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 1771, 1775 (arguing that courts should assess only “the substantiality of 
the civil penalties triggered by religious exercise”). 
360. See Eternal Word Television Network, Inc. v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 
818 F.3d 1122, 1144-45 (11th Cir. 2016) (“We agree with our seven sister circuits that the ques-
tion of substantial burden also presents ‘a question of law for courts to decide.’” (quoting 
Priests for Life v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 772 F.3d 229 (D.C. Cir. 2014))). 
361. Zubik, 136 S. Ct. at 1560. 
362. United States v. Merkt, 794 F.2d 950, 956 (5th Cir. 1986). 
363. See, e.g., Eternal Word, 818 F.3d at 1144-51. 
364. Id. 
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From the standpoint of substantive equality, courts should also be attentive 
to societal context. For example, the Seventh Circuit has found that “whether a 
given burden is substantial depends on its magnitude in relation to the needs 
and resources of the religious organization in question.”
366
 The same burden 
might be greater on an immigrant congregation of a nontraditional faith than on 
the Episcopal Church. In individual cases, a burden on certain elements of some-
one’s religious practice might be more substantial where their liberty and iden-
tity are otherwise fundamentally limited, such as in detention. There may also 
be cases where a burden, viewed within the social and historical context, will be 
understood to express societal disapproval of a minority faith, which raises dif-




The impact of an objective analysis on sanctuary claims would vary from case 
to case. If a congregation saw sanctuary as no more than one of several perfectly 
equivalent means of performing their duty of care to others, the burden might 
not be substantial.
368
 Substantial burdens would still likely exist where congre-
gations thought that there was something unique about sanctuary, such that a 
congregation did not feel there was another way to fulﬁll their obligations. This 
might be particularly stark along the border, where humanitarian activists face 




b. Preexisting Exemptions 
Another one of the most contentious unanswered questions in RFRA doc-
trine today is what role preexisting exemptions should play in a court’s analysis. 
In other words, where the law in question already includes an exemption for 
similar conduct in other instances, how should this factor in to whether a partic-
ular religious individual should be granted an exemption? In Hobby Lobby, for 
 
365. See id. at 1146-47; see also United States v. Sterling, 75 M.J. 407, 417-20 (C.A.A.F. 2016). 
366. World Outreach Conference Ctr. v. City of Chicago, 591 F.3d 531, 539 (7th Cir. 2009). 
367. This was the case, for example, in the aftermath of Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 
U.S. 586 (1940). See supra note 98 and accompanying text. 
368. See Oklevueha Native Am. Church of Haw., Inc. v. Lynch, 828 F.3d 1012, 1017 (9th Cir. 2016) 
(ﬁnding no substantial burden where a legal alternative could serve “the exact same religious 
function”). 
369. See supra note 202 and accompanying text. 
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example, the Court treated an existing exemption for religious nonproﬁts as a 
decisive argument in favor of expanding the accommodation to include religious 
for-proﬁt companies with effectively the same beliefs.
370
  Read broadly, this 
could mean that where an exception already exists, a less restrictive means is es-
sentially per se available to the government. 
Applying this broad reading of Hobby Lobby into the sanctuary context would 
make an accommodation inevitable, given the existing exemption for ministers 
and missionaries. Hopefully this example helps reveal the impracticability of 
such a broad position. Legislatures have a need to craft compromises around ac-
commodations, which will often involve weighing a number of factors, religious 
and otherwise. Treating every exception as justiﬁcation for opening the door to 
all other accommodations is problematic in its own right and would have the 
counterproductive effect of deterring legislative accommodations.
371
  Instead, 
courts should be attentive to several factors, including the reason that the exist-
ing exception was created and how many individuals it covers. Attentiveness to 
subordination offers a principled line when evaluating such cases. Take O Centro, 
where a larger faith group had received a legislative accommodation for the use 
of a hallucinogenic compound in religious ceremonies, while a smaller group 
faced criminal prosecution for functionally similar conduct.
372
 Expanding the 
existing accommodation to the smaller group helps remedy exactly the kind of 
inequality RFRA targeted. 
Yet where a preexisting exemption does not distinguish between faiths and 
where the requested accommodation represents mainstream views that had been 
well represented in the legislative process, the existence of exceptions should not 
be as determinative. The preexisting exemption in Hobby Lobby, for example, did 
not raise concerns about disparate treatment between faiths or systemic un-
derrepresentation.
373
 Not only were the religious views advanced by the for-
proﬁt business owners politically well represented in general, but the existing 
regulatory accommodation for nonproﬁts itself reﬂects political inﬂuence. In 
other words, the government had already accounted for the relevant religious 
 
370. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2782 (2014). 
371. The amicus brief of the Baptist Joint Committee in Zubik, authored in part by Douglas Lay-
cock, offers a good explanation of why this broad reading would threaten the existence of 
legislative accommodations. Brief of Baptist Joint Committee for Religious Liberty as Amicus 
Curiae in Support of Respondents at 28-37, Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016) (No. 14-
1418), 2016 WL 692850. 
372. Gonzalez v. O Centro Espirita Beneﬁcente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006). 
373. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2763, 2781-83 (describing the preexisting accommodation for 
religious nonproﬁts). 
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objections and struck a balance. In such instances, courts can take existing ex-
emptions into account but should be reluctant to render them dispositive. An 
even clearer case would be Zubik, in which the claimant nonproﬁts had already 
received a degree of accommodation, or Stormans, in which the existing exemp-
tions did not favor another group of believers.
374
 
Determining when existing exemptions raise subordination concerns will 
not always be straightforward, nor is it amenable to a bright-line rule. But nei-
ther are power differentials invisible. Courts can look to a number of factors, 
including the size of the relevant groups, their past history of treatment, whether 
different groups’ concerns were taken into account in the political process, and 
the plausibility of the reasons given for treating the groups differently.
375
 This is 
not the same thing as requiring proof of prejudicial intent, but instead involves 
evaluating broader context to identify possible concerns of disparate treatment, 
including inaction.
376
 While this evaluation may at times impose a more nu-
anced task on the courts, it is less costly than an approach that, by blinding itself 
to the very asymmetries of political inﬂuence that justiﬁed the statute in the ﬁrst 




374. Stormans, Inc. v. Wiesman, 136 S. Ct. 2433 (2016); Zubik, 136 S. Ct. 1557. 
375. In the case of RLUIPA, for example, these contexts were identiﬁed by documenting historical 
patterns of differential treatment, arbitrary use of discretion, and pretextual explanations. See, 
e.g., Storzer & Picarello, supra note 146, at 943-44. These factors are not all that dissimilar from 
the familiar Arlington Heights inquiry performed by courts in other areas of law. Village of 
Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265-68 (1977). Indeed, some 
accommodation advocates have argued that the Arlington Heights factors should be taken into 
account when evaluating preexisting exemptions in the constitutional free exercise context. 
See Thomas C. Berg & Douglas Laycock, Masterpiece Cakeshop and Reading Smith Carefully: 
A Reply to Jim Oleske, TAKE CARE BLOG (Oct. 30, 2017), https://takecareblog.com/blog 
/masterpiece-cakeshop-and-reading-smith-carefully-a-reply-to-jim-oleske [https://perma
.cc/GJJ5-FG6Z]. And courts have been willing to create rules that are particularly attentive to 
the vulnerable position of disfavored minority groups. See Brown v. Socialist Workers ’74 
Campaign Comm. (Ohio), 459 U.S. 87, 88, 91-98 (1982) (noting that in the context of dis-
closure requirements on political parties, the Court had set a lower bar for the showing re-
quired from minor parties). 
376. This analysis is similar to the “equal regard” idea advocated by Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 
113, though it does not involve hypothetical comparisons to how mainstream faiths would be 
treated but rather an examination of existing exemptions. 
377. Of course, the relative size and political inﬂuence of faiths is not ﬁxed forever. Indeed, part of 
what explains the current divides over accommodation is that in various areas religious con-
servatives have lost a relative degree of inﬂuence. This leads to questions about where to draw 
the line. What would happen if a small group were to become larger or more powerful over 
time, or the reverse? And what about groups that may be minorities nationally, but powerful 
locally or at the state level? In both instances, RFRA’s focus on a particularized inquiry helps 
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Nor does taking subordination into account mean impermissibly favoring 
minority faiths over mainstream faiths. There is no doubt that government fa-
voritism of certain faiths would run afoul of the Establishment Clause. Yet tak-
ing power differentials into account when evaluating the propriety of govern-
ment action is not an expression of favoritism, but rather quite the opposite. It 
seeks to more accurately identify instances of de facto systemic favoritism in or-
der to dismantle them. In so doing, it treats different relevant societal and political 
contexts differently, not the faiths themselves—just as would happen in the con-
stitutional free exercise context if in one case there was evidence of prejudice be-
hind a law, but in an otherwise similar case there was not. Because of RFRA’s 
case-by-case application, different claims by different faiths (or by different in-
dividuals of the same faith) will tend to receive a different analysis based on the 
context giving rise to those claims. A look at the broader social context would 
simply be another part of this particularized analysis. 
c. Administrative Costs 
There is a short section of dictum in Hobby Lobby that can be read as saying 
that courts should only weigh increased administrative costs associated with 
granting an accommodation when those costs would be signiﬁcant relative to the 
cost of the entire regulatory project (in that case, the ACA).
378
 Otherwise, if the 
government tried claiming that granting an accommodation would be too ex-
pensive, this would undercut the government’s own assertion that it was pursu-
ing an interest of the highest order.
379
 As the sanctuary context makes clear, how-
ever, at some point administrative costs must be taken into account. RFRA 
strikes a balance between protections of exercise and the ability of the govern-
ment to operate. It is therefore entirely consistent with the law to apply a rule of 
proportionality and reason to increased administrative expenses. In the case of 
sanctuary, where congregations would be willing to honor a valid judicial war-
rant, this cost can hardly be considered dispositive. Yet in a hypothetical situa-
tion where sanctuary volunteers were actively smuggling persons across the bor-
der, the increased costs on the government of detecting and apprehending those 
individuals would weigh heavily against granting an accommodation. 
 
provide an answer. Because courts look closely to the context at the time of the case, a mean-
ingful change in circumstances would not preclude subsequent reexamination. As to the latter, 
the relevant analysis would be the group’s representation at the level of the governmental unit 
that took the action in question. 
378. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2781. 
379. Id. 
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d. Antidiscrimination and Compelling Interest 
While the relationship between religious accommodation doctrine and other 
antidiscrimination laws does not arise in sanctuary cases, I will address it brieﬂy 
here because it would be informed by understanding RFRA as part of a broader 
equality project. The question of religious accommodations from antidiscrimi-
nation laws is at the center of high-proﬁle cases in which religious business own-
ers ask for religious exceptions from antidiscrimination laws to deny certain ser-
vices to LGBT couples
380
 or to ﬁre transgender employees based on their gender 
identity.
381
 Preserving status hierarchies by allowing mainstream faiths
382
 to opt 
out of legal protections for historically subordinate groups is at odds with a stat-
ute that was presented as an important complement to other civil rights laws pro-
tecting minorities and thus part of a broader, intersectional project of creating a 
more equal society.
383
 This is especially true when requested religious accommo-
dations would impose direct harms on third-parties because of their status as 
members of historically subordinate groups. As Justice Kennedy noted in Mas-
terpiece, if all providers of goods and services for weddings could refuse to serve 
a same-sex couple on religious grounds, the result would be “a community-wide 
stigma inconsistent with the history and dynamics of civil rights laws that ensure 
 
380. See, e.g., Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1727 
(2018). 
381. See, e.g., EEOC v. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 884 F.3d 560 (6th Cir. 2018). 
382. Accommodation requests by minority faiths in a context that raised concerns about systemic 
underrepresentation would raise different concerns, but not different outcomes in the mine-
run of cases. Evidence that exemptions were in fact being made for better-represented groups 
would be legitimate cause for concern. Accommodations for small, insular groups would not 
raise the same threat of “community-wide stigma” that Justice Kennedy mentions. See infra 
note 384 and accompanying text. So while in certain cases the analysis could differ, to the 
extent burdens would be placed on concrete third parties, in the balance an accommodation 
should typically be denied. 
383. See 1992 House Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 126, at 337 (statement of Douglas Laycock) 
(“Racial and ethnic minorities are often also religious minorities. The civil rights laws are to 
little avail unless they provide for religious liberty as well as for racial and ethnic justice.”); see 
also Transcript of Oral Argument at 57, City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (No. 95-
2074) (stating that without RFRA, “more inﬂuential and politically well-connected religions, 
powerful sector interests, will get exemptions when more marginal religions, particularly 
those that represent racial and ethnic minorities, will not get exemptions”); Carter, supra note 
301, at 129-30 (noting that the lack of effects-based accommodation protections will particu-
larly harm “people of color and (in recent years) religions that draw their members principally 
or exclusively from people of color”). 
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equal access to goods, services, and public accommodations.”
384
 Though Mas-
terpiece was a constitutional free exercise case, the same concerns would clearly 
carry over into the RFRA context. 
Furthermore, antidiscrimination laws are necessary for ensuring the protec-
tion of religious minorities.
385
 Allowing employers religious exemptions from 
antidiscrimination laws would tend to disproportionately burden minority 
faiths—precisely the opposite outcome from what RFRA intended.
386
 Courts 
should therefore recognize that antidiscrimination protections are compelling 
interests that can rarely be effectively pursued by granting accommodations that 
restore the societal disadvantage of protected groups.
387
 Masterpiece is not to the 
contrary, as it turned on a ﬁnding of actual prejudice, rather than the appropri-
ateness of creating an accommodation from a neutral, generally applicable law.
388
 
Nor would interpreting RFRA in this way conﬂict with Hosanna-Tabor Evangel-
ical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC,
389
 in which a unanimous Court granted 
a church an exemption to an antidiscrimination law in selecting its minister un-
der a “ministerial exemption” based in the Religion Clauses.
390
 Hosanna-Tabor is 
best understood as based on core principles of association and community au-
tonomy, rather than as a guide for interpreting all cases raised by religious claim-




And ﬁnally, beyond these speciﬁc doctrinal questions, there is a deep require-
ment—at the very least—of evenhandedness in RFRA’s effective application. 
 
384. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1727. 
385. See Brief of Amici Curiae 15 Faith and Civil Rights Organizations in Support of Respondents 
at 17, Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (No. 16-111). 
386. The possibility of such cases is not hypothetical. See, e.g., Campos v. City of Blue Springs, 289 
F.3d 546 (8th Cir. 2002); Sarah Posner, South Carolina Sought an Exemption to Allow a Foster-
Care Agency to Discriminate Against Non-Christians, NATION (June 15, 2018), https://www 
.thenation.com/article/south-carolina-sought-exemption-allow-foster-care-agency 
-discriminate-non-christians [https://perma.cc/CRF4-4QHY] (detailing attempts to secure 
an exemption under RFRA for a foster-care-placement agency that “refuses to place foster 
children with non-Christian families”);  cf. EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 S. 
Ct. 2028, 2031 (2015) (holding that an employer’s refusal to hire a Muslim individual because 
her headscarf did not match the store’s “Look Policy” was a violation of Title VII). 
387. For a nuanced and lucid account of this position, see Robert Post, RFRA and First Amendment 
Freedom of Expression, 125 YALE L.J.F. 387 (2016). 
388. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1729. 
389. 565 U.S. 171 (2012). 
390. Id. at 188. 
391. See supra note 334. 
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There is some evidence that, in practice, faith groups most in need of counter-
majoritarian protection have fared the worst in courts.
392
 If courts were to con-
sciously understand RFRA as showing a special solicitude to minority faiths and 
subordinate persons, this might help counteract this trend. This is not solely 
speculative, as prisoner claims under RLUIPA, which singled out this population 
for protection, were more successful than those under RFRA.
393
 Other stark 
asymmetries would also need to be remedied. For example, the term “person” in 
RFRA has been read to extend to for-proﬁt corporations holding mainstream 
beliefs, yet not to include prisoners held at Guantanamo Bay.
394
 
2. Rebuilding Consensus 
On the other side, sanctuary can be a reminder of why, historically, religious 
exemptions were once a progressive priority.
395
 Accommodations to laws of gen-
eral applicability help produce a more equal society in several ways. Effects-
based protections help ensure de facto parity between the exercise protections of 
mainstream faiths and those of minorities or disfavored groups such as prison-
ers, as recent court cases illustrate.
396
 Accommodation can also shield religious 
communities seeking to assist members of disfavored groups, like protecting the 
church in Fifth Avenue Presbyterian’s ability to provide sanctuary to homeless per-
sons without being raided by the NYPD.
397
 Religious exercise protections have 
also served to block local communities from effectively evicting or barring reli-
gious organizations from operating homeless shelters, soup kitchens, or rehabil-
itative services to addicts.
398
 
Various forms of sanctuary ﬁt within the above values and in so doing con-
tribute to a more equal society. As the Supreme Court recognized in 1982, our 
 
392. Michael Heise & Gregory C. Sisk, Free Exercise of Religion Before the Bench: Empirical Evidence 
from the Federal Courts, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1371, 1374 (2013) (“Notably, among claimants, 
Muslims were signiﬁcantly and powerfully associated with adverse outcomes before the 
courts.”). Quantitative analyses of court cases are difficult, however, and not all studies have 
found the same results. See, e.g., Caleb C. Wolanek & Heidi Liu, Applying Strict Scrutiny: An 
Empirical Analysis of Free Exercise Cases, 78 MONT. L. REV. 275, 308 (2017). 
393. Gaubatz, supra note 314, at 560. 
394. See Aamer v. Obama, 742 F.3d 1023, 1043 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
395. See supra Part II. 
396. See Holt v. Dobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853 (2015); Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneﬁcente Uniao do 
Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006); Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005). 
397. Fifth Ave. Presbyterian Church v. City of New York, 293 F.3d 570, 574 (2d Cir. 2002). 
398. See supra note 194 and accompanying text. 
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immigration policies have allowed a “permanent caste of undocumented resi-
dent aliens, encouraged by some to remain here as a source of cheap labor, but 
nevertheless denied the beneﬁts that our society makes available to citizens and 
lawful residents.”
399
 Speaking in an antisubordination register, the Court noted 
that “[t]he existence of such an underclass presents most difficult problems for 
a Nation that prides itself on adherence to principles of equality under law.”
400
 
RFRA’s limitations on surveillance or raids on places of worship with undocu-
mented congregants are analogous to protections for systemically disadvantaged 
groups whose status renders their ability to practice especially vulnerable. Sur-
veillance and raids would interfere directly with the religious practice of a polit-
ically marginalized population—both undocumented individuals and docu-
mented family members. As with incarcerated persons, religious freedom in such 
contexts is fundamentally tied to a basic right to exist as a human being with 
beliefs society should take seriously, despite one’s relegation to a secondary legal 
status. 
In cases where sanctuary was not part of the religious practice of the individ-
uals in sanctuary themselves, the connection to substantive-equality concerns is 
more indirect. Though in these cases sanctuary does not implicate the structural 
underrepresentation of certain religious groups in the same way, none of the 
doctrinal limitations discussed earlier in this Part would bar such a claim. And 
such claims illustrate how religious exercise protections can foster broader goals 
of equality by protecting religious communities that seek to assist members of 
disfavored groups. Through sanctuary, congregations are in effect saying that an 
undocumented individual is more than just a secondary legal status—she is a 
fellow human being who is entitled to care and shelter as such. Subordination 
concerns are clearly at stake when our laws tell people that if they treat a fellow 
human being as more than their secondary legal status they will face criminal 
sanction. It is one thing to say that for the purpose of certain legal entitlements, 
undocumented individuals are on a different footing. It is quite another to re-
quire that undocumented persons, who have often been de facto members of 
communities for years, not be treated as such by others. This places the undoc-
umented not just in a secondary legal status, but beyond the pale of basic inter-
personal moral obligations. Sanctuary in its various forms carves out room for 
persons of conscience to treat their undocumented neighbors or fellow commu-
nity members as such, and to extend a hand when they are in need. This same 
logic would apply with even greater force to faith-based groups providing life-
saving assistance to migrants in the desert. A migrant, stranded and dehydrated 
 
399. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 218-19 (1982). 
400. Id. at 219. 
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in the Sonoran Desert, is not just an “unlawful border crosser” but a human be-
ing whose life is at risk. To punish volunteers for providing assistance to that 
person is to enforce the migrant’s subordination to the point that it denies her 
ability to make even the most basic claim on a shared humanity. 
And sanctuary congregations are not really making their own immigration 
laws, as courts had warned in the 1980s. Instead, they are providing a kind of 
“community stay” of a person’s deportation. This allows an individual to assess 
her options with the support and resources of family, community, and lawyers—
all of which may become more difficult to access if she is deported almost imme-
diately. Synagogues, mosques, and churches can claim the legitimacy to provide 
such stays in part because of their role in the fabric of our civil society as repre-
sentative, accountable, community institutions. Sanctuary is thus similar to the 
private bills that lawmakers would introduce to protect individuals from depor-




Sanctuary claims therefore present a concrete and timely example of why 
progressives should not be unduly hasty in retreating from religious accommo-
dation claims. Of course, courts could ultimately ﬁnd ways to reject such claims 
while simultaneously expanding accommodations to antidiscrimination laws 
protecting LGBT individuals and laws concerning reproductive care. If that oc-
curs, RFRA and accommodation protections generally will continue to become 
more politically divisive and ultimately more tenuous. This is an outcome that 
should gravely concern anyone who is serious about ensuring equal treatment 
across faiths or about protecting religious freedom more generally. 
conclusion 
The renewed interest in sanctuary among communities of faith has come at 
a propitious time. Legal protections for exemptions to laws of general applica-
bility receive considerably more protection in practice than they did in the 1980s. 
Shifts in the political valence of religious exemption arguments have created an 
environment where religious conservatives are signiﬁcantly more open to the ar-
guments in favor of such exceptions. In this piece, I have outlined doctrinal and 
normative arguments for why the protection of sanctuary congregations is con-
sistent with the current laws around religious freedom. While sanctuary is—as 
 
401. Thomas D. Homan, Policy Number 5004.1: Stays of Removal and Private Immigration Bills, U.S. 
IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT (May 5, 2017), https://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/dro
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was true in the 1980s—a fundamentally incomplete response to a greater injus-
tice, it can nonetheless play an important role in allowing communities to protect 
people in danger and bear witness to the harms being visited upon these indi-
viduals and their families. For those in sanctuary, it can often serve as a crucial 
reprieve for them to pursue various forms of legal immigration relief. In so do-
ing, such claims hold the potential to defuse growing partisan divides over 
RFRA and restore an equilibrium around the protection of the most vulnerable 
members of our society. This piece has offered an affirmative account of what 
that equilibrium should look like. An account of RFRA as showing a special so-
licitude to minority faiths and disadvantaged groups is consistent with the his-
tory and structure of the statute. At the same time, it would help create princi-
pled limits to accommodation, staving off some of the more controversial efforts 
by mainstream faith groups to expand RFRA’s protections. A bipartisan consen-
sus over RFRA was possible at one point in the not-so-distant past—whether it 
can be reclaimed in the future remains to be seen.   
 
